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I. INTRODUCTION 
By making federal law supreme to state law, the U.S. 
Constitution gives Congress an extraordinary power.1 Perhaps 
the extraordinarily powerful nature of the Supremacy Clause is 
the reason for its checkered treatment by the Supreme Court. 
Recent preemption decisions give lip service to federalism 
concerns, but in many cases state statutes, regulations, and 
remedies have been struck down with little regard for either 
federalstate comity or institutional competence. If federal 
regulatory regimes always accomplished optimal regulation
perfect equipoise between protecting human health and 
promoting economic development while fostering innovation by 
governments and regulated entitiespreemption of state law 
would be far less controversial. Of course, federal regulatory 
regimes are not always perfect, and the preemption of state laws 
can leave dangerous regulatory gaps. 
Preemption is particularly troublesome when Congress has 
included a savings clause in the statute at issue. Many federal 
public health and environmental statutes include savings clauses 
intended to leave ample room for state law to provide increased 
protection above the federal regulatory floor. Yet recent Supreme 
Court cases reveal a pattern of increasingly hostile reception of 
savings clauses. This seems particularly true in cases involving 
state regulatory programs, while tort claims have been treated 
somewhat more favorably. The inclusion of generously worded 
savings clauses for state tort claims may explain the results in 
some cases, but the text of most savings clauses is so similar 
that, as the Court has noted, [n]ot even the most dedicated hair-
splitter could distinguish them.2 
                                                          
 1. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991); see also U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 
(This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance 
thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be 
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary 
notwithstanding.). 
 2. Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 446 n.21 (2005) (citation 
omitted). 
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Congress itself has, in some instances, muddied the waters 
by including both preemption clauses and savings clauses in the 
same statute. Dueling clauses pose an interpretive conundrum 
for courts. Both savings clauses and preemption clauses serve to 
demarcate the boundaries of federal and state law, but unlike 
preemption clauses, savings clauses strike the balance in favor of 
states and state law remedies. In many Supreme Court cases, 
however, their combined effect has been to neutralize or weaken 
state police powers and, in turn, diminish the protection of 
health, safety, and environmental quality by leaving gaping holes 
in the regulatory framework. 
One can hardly dispute that preemption issues are complex 
and highly nuanced, involving both federalism and separation of 
powerscongressional prerogatives, agency competence, and 
judicial deferenceas well as efficiency, equity, victim 
compensation, and cost-shifting objectives. By focusing 
specifically on cases involving statutory savings clauses, this 
Article makes a modest attempt to identify preemption patterns 
and principles from a discrete set of opinions issued by the 
Rehnquist and Roberts Courts through 2008. It undertakes a 
comparative analysis of case law in four areas: (1) the 
environment; (2) labor and employment; (3) products liability; 
and (4) agricultural practices. These four were chosen both 
because of the tremendous activity in these areas by all three 
branches of the federal government since the 1980s and because 
of their importance to federalstate relations. This study is, 
admittedly, neither a comprehensive survey nor an empirical 
analysis of all one hundred-plus preemption cases issued by the 
Rehnquist and Roberts Courts.3 Rather, it is more narrowly 
drawn in hopes of making sense of the Courts treatment of 
savings clauses and, by extension, its treatment of an important 
piece of evidence regarding congressional intent on preemption. 
The analysis of key cases in these four areas indicates that, 
where Congress has included a savings clause in the allegedly 
preemptive federal statute, the Rehnquist Court was willing to 
allow some redress to injured persons, yet at the same time it 
paid little attention to savings clauses when it came to the 
preemption of protective state or local regulations. Where state 
                                                          
 3. See Michael S. Greve & Jonathan Klick, Preemption in the Rehnquist Court: A 
Preliminary Empirical Assessment, 14 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 43, 49 (2006) (identifying 105 
preemption cases issued by the Rehnquist Court from the 198687 Term to the 200304 
Term). During the period assessed by Greve and Klick, an average of six preemption cases 
was issued each term. Id. Without performing an exact nose count, it is safe to assume 
that, since 2004, there have been at least twenty more. 
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or local regulations were challenged on preemption grounds, 
neither the statutory language nor the overarching congressional 
goals seemed to carry much weight. Although an empirical study 
of the full range of preemption cases issued by the Rehnquist 
Court indicated that preemption may be less likely when a state 
is a party to the dispute,4 in the cases surveyed in this Article, 
judicial outcomes reflect an antiregulatory sentiment, whether or 
not a state played a role in the litigation. A majority of the 
members of the Rehnquist Court apparently viewed positive 
legislative enactments and formal regulatory programs issued by 
state and local governments as a significant threat to the 
implementation of federal programs and the accomplishment of 
federal goals, notwithstanding congressional intent to the 
contrary. The results in the regulatory cases often fell short of 
protecting people and their environment, and frustrated or even 
eviscerated legislative objectives as well as federalism ideals. 
If we narrow the focus even further and consider only the 
Roberts Court, a nascent trend in favor of business and against 
both state interests and injured persons alike is discernible in 
both tort and regulatory cases. The most significant tort case 
issued by the Roberts Court to date, Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 
indicates that the Court is taking an especially broad view of 
preemption clauses and a correspondingly dim view of savings 
clauses.5 It is too early to tell whether we might expect it to find 
preemption whenever business interests are affected, regardless 
of the context, but Riegel may be indicative of the future direction 
of the Roberts Court. 
The assessment of preemption cases involving statutory 
savings clauses makes one thing, at least, readily apparent. 
Dangerous regulatory gaps would be far less likely if savings 
clauses were given appropriate weight in both the regulatory 
context and the tort context. One could take this conclusion a 
step further and hypothesize that taking savings clauses 
                                                          
 4. See id. at 68. Greve and Klick found no discernible distinction between the 
results in tort cases and regulatory cases of the Rehnquist Court but, rather, concluded 
that states tend to do better in defeating preemption challenges when one of them is a 
party to a case. Id. at 76. Their analysis included all preemption cases from 19862003 
and did not focus on those involving federal savings clauses. Id. at 46. For discussion of 
the Greve and Klick report, see infra notes 4852 and accompanying text. 
 5. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 1003, 1011 (2008). The outcome of 
another major product liability case pending before the Court this term, Levine v. Wyeth, 
944 A.2d 179 (Vt. 2006), cert. granted, 128 S. Ct. 1118 (2008), is likely to shed light on the 
Courts view of state tort law. Like Riegel, Levine seeks a remedy for injuries caused by a 
product approved by the Food and Drug Administration, but unlike Riegel, the statute at 
issue in Levine does not include a preemption clause. See infra notes 196203 and 
accompanying text. 
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seriously would also enhance oft-cited but only infrequently 
applied congressional objectives of cooperative federalism, as 
local, state, and federal entities would be motivated and 
empowered to capitalize on each of their institutional strengths 
and to craft coordinated regulatory and tort-based solutions. 
This Article sets off in Part II with an assessment of the 
relationship of preemption and federalism. Part III turns to the 
Rehnquist and Roberts Courts treatment of savings clauses 
when victims seek tort remedies for harm caused by federally 
regulated activities or products. Next, Part IV assesses the 
tendency, during the Rehnquist era and continuing through the 
Roberts Court, to give short shrift to savings clauses when state 
governments seek to establish more stringent regulatory 
requirements than imposed by the federal floor. The Article 
concludes in Part V with suggestions for crafting statutory 
savings clauses that may survive preemption challenges, as well 
as more global observations on harmonizing federal objectives 
with state tort law and state and local regulatory initiatives. In 
light of the Roberts Courts apparent pro-preemption proclivity, 
there may be no magic language that ensures against 
preemption. Careful congressional drafting, however, may 
promote more rational, equitable results, at least in close cases. 
II. PREEMPTION AND FEDERALISM 
The system of joint sovereignty in America is intended to 
promote a decentralized government that is responsive to the 
needs of a heterogeneous democratic society by preventing 
capture by industry, increasing opportunities for public 
involvement, and encouraging governmental creativity by 
making states compete to satisfy a mobile citizenry.6 The 
question is whether federalism as we know itincluding both the 
allocation of power addressed in Article I of the Constitution and 
the choice of law considerations embedded in the Supremacy 
Clause of Article VIadvances those goals or whether it simply 
serves preemptive, antiregulatory impulses. Reams of scholarly 
commentary have been written on the former (constitutional 
power) and only slightly less on the latter (preemption).7 This 
                                                          
 6. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458; see also Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: 
Evaluating the Founders Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 149293 (1987) (reviewing 
RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS DESIGN (1987)). 
 7. For seminal articles on preemption, see generally Viet D. Dinh, Reassessing the 
Law of Preemption, 88 GEO. L.J. 2085 (2000); Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of 
Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 767 (1994); Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225 
(2000); and Catherine M. Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble: Federal Agencies and the 
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Article focuses on the latter, but puts a finer point on the inquiry 
to draw attention to a topic that has received far less analysis
judicial treatment of savings clauses meant to preserve state law 
from displacement by federal law. 
First, a few words on federalism. American federalism is 
defined generally as the extent to which state autonomy limits 
the exercise of federal power.8 The classic description comes from 
a Supreme Court dissent penned by Justice Brandeis: It is one of 
the happy incidents of the federal system that a single 
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a 
laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments 
without risk to the rest of the country.9 
Federalism has a dual nature. At its best, federalism 
safeguards the public from dangerous, tyrannical impulses at the 
national level by allowing flexible, decentralized institutions to 
flourish.10 At its worst, federalism impedes rational, 
comprehensive planning and the achievement of uniform yet 
progressive results that transcend political boundaries.11 The 
                                                          
Federalization of Tort Law, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 227 (2007). Although federalism articles 
are so plentiful that they evade any reasonable attempt at listing, important ones include 
Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425 (1987); Erwin 
Chemerinsky, The Values of Federalism, 47 FLA. L. REV. 499 (1995); Samuel Issacharoff & 
Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1353 (2006); 
McConnell, supra note 6; Laurence H. Tribe, Unraveling National League of Cities: The 
New Federalism and Affirmative Rights to Essential Government Services, 90 HARV. L. 
REV. 1065 (1977); Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of 
the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. 
REV. 543 (1954). 
 8. See Chemerinsky, supra note 7, at 504. 
 9. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting). 
 10. DONALD J. PISANI, WATER AND AMERICAN GOVERNMENT: THE RECLAMATION 
BUREAU, NATIONAL WATER POLICY, AND THE WEST, 19021935, at 295 (2002); see also THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 5859, 62 (James Madison) (Carl Van Doren ed., 1979) (arguing 
that the federal system renders factions unable to concert and carry into effect schemes 
of oppression because the influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their 
particular States, but will be unable to spread a general conflagration through the other 
States). 
 11. See Charles E. Davis & James P. Lester, Federalism and Environmental Policy, 
in ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS AND POLICY: THEORIES AND EVIDENCE 57, 59 (James P. 
Lester ed., 1989) (identifying efficiency gains as one argument in support of 
problemsolving at the national level); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Against Preemption: How 
Federalism Can Improve the National Legislative Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 69 (2007) 
(describing efficiency-based arguments against federalism); Robert Ressetar, The Yucca 
Mountain Nuclear Waste Repository from a Federalism Perspective, 23 J. LAND 
RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 219, 221 (2003) (identifying five reasons for an active federal role 
in environmental protection: the inability of the states to enforce adequate 
environmental standards on their own . . . local resistance to environmental protection, 
especially with regard to transboundary pollution; [the need to guarantee] minimal 
protection for a mobile population; [the need to help] states resist industry pressure to 
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latter theme can be seen in the work of numerous scholars, 
including this Author, who place a heavy emphasis on federal 
law for protecting public health and the environment.12 Even 
beyond areas of customary federal concern, such as national 
security, air traffic control, navigation, Indian affairs, and 
immigration,13 the federal government is often in the best 
position to remedy transboundary problems such as air and 
water pollution and the manufacture and sale of dangerous 
chemicals and drugs. It possesses greater resources and data-
collection capabilities than any single state. In addition, federal 
law can provide uniform, forward-looking solutions to widespread 
problems. State law, on the other hand, is relatively inefficient 
when it comes to solving these types of problems because of a 
lack of expertise and a parochial inclination to impose external 
costs on neighboring states.14 
From the post-New Deal years to the modern era, federal 
regulation has become more comprehensive and, consequently, 
the Supremacy Clause has become more significant.15 The 
preemption doctrine is a tool for defining the parameters of 
federal supremacy when Congress has adopted legislation 
pursuant to other enumerated powers, such as the Commerce 
Clause or the Spending Clause.16 
                                                          
relax standards (the race-to-the-bottom hypothesis); and industry preference for uniform 
federal standards instead of a variety of state standards). 
 12. See, e.g., Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. 
REV. 570, 574 (1996) (suggesting regulatory responses should be delegated to the level of 
government best adapted to solve a particular environmental problem); Robert L. 
Glicksman, From Cooperative to Inoperative Federalism: The Perverse Mutation of 
Environmental Law and Policy, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 719, 802 (2006) (lamenting the 
federal governments failure to solidify its authority over environmental regulation); 
Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REV. 243, 316 
(2005) (advocating a polyphonic conception of federalism that would reduce restrictions 
on federal authority); Rena I. Steinzor, Devolution and the Public Health, 24 HARV. 
ENVTL. L. REV. 351, 364 (2000) (arguing that the protection of health and safety through 
federal environmental regulation should be one of the roles of democratic government); 
Sandra Zellmer, A Tale of Two Imperiled Rivers: Reflections from a Post-Katrina World, 
59 FLA. L. REV. 599, 61718 (2007) (arguing for the enactment of a holistic federal 
strategy in water law). 
 13. Hills, supra note 11, at 8. 
 14. Id. at 1, 7. 
 15. Sandra B. Zellmer, The Devil, The Details, and the Dawn of the 21st Century 
Administrative State: Beyond the New Deal, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 941, 96768 (2000) 
(describing the post-New Deal Supreme Courts willingness to uphold broad federal 
legislation on Commerce Clause grounds). The New Deal era tracks the Roosevelt 
presidency from 19331945. Stephen Gardbaum, New Deal Constitutionalism and the 
Unshackling of the States, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 483, 485 n.6 (1997); Zellmer, supra, at 959.  
 16. Mary J. Davis, Unmasking the Presumption in Favor of Preemption, 53 S.C. L. 
REV. 967, 968 (2002). 
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Congressional objectives are the touchstone of any 
preemption case.17 If Congress has included an express 
preemption provision in a statute, then courts must simply 
interpret that provision. As in many areas of statutory 
interpretation, this is often easier said than done. Application of 
the preemption doctrine is even trickier in the absence of an 
express preemption provision. In those cases, courts apply one of 
three categories of implied preemption: (1) field occupation, 
where the federal legislation is so comprehensive that Congress 
must have intended to occupy the field; and (2) conflict 
preemption, where state law must yield to federal law because 
either (a) there is an actual conflict such that a party cannot 
possibly comply with both federal and state law; or (b) state law 
poses an obstacle to the achievement of federal objectives.18 
Before the explosion of federal public health and 
environmental requirements, state and local authorities 
exercised their police powers through regulations and common 
law theories to combat the multifarious problems of an 
increasingly industrialized society. In particular, federal and 
state courts alike accepted common law doctrines of nuisance, 
trespass, and strict liability as appropriate means to address the 
effects of harmful industrial activities.19 Since its 1947 opinion in 
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.,20 the Supreme Court has 
routinely espoused adherence to a presumption against 
preemption when federal law bumps up against activities within 
the states historic police powers.21 Among such state powers are 
the protection of health and safety, utility and insurance 
regulation, agricultural practices, tort law, and domestic (family) 
relations.22 Although the strength of the presumption has waxed 
                                                          
 17. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (quoting Retail Clerks Intl 
Assn, Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963)). 
 18. Davis, supra note 16, at 970. 
 19. Alexandra B. Klass, Common Law and Federalism in the Age of the Regulatory 
State, 92 IOWA L. REV. 545, 56768 (2007). 
 20. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). 
 21. Davis, supra note 16, at 968. Although a presumption against preemption was 
mentioned in earlier cases, see, e.g., N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Winfield, 244 U.S. 147, 156 n.1 
(1917) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (declaring that state police power will not be preempted 
unless it actually frustrate[s] . . . the intended operation of the federal legislation), the 
modern iteration is typically traced to Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., in which the Court 
stated, [W]e start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were 
not to be superseded by Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of 
Congress. Rice, 331 U.S. at 230. See Gardbaum, supra note 15, at 536 (referring to the 
Rice decision as the locus classicus of modern preemption doctrine). 
 22. See Silkwood v. KerrMcGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 255 (1984) (tort law); Pac. Gas 
& Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Commn, 461 U.S. 190, 205 (1983) 
(utility regulation); Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 581 (1979) (domestic 
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and waned through the years,23 generally speaking, tort claims 
for harm from pollution and other activities affecting public 
health and welfare were routinely upheld, even in heavily 
regulated areas where the federal interest was deemed most 
compelling. Unless regulated entities could rebut this 
presumption by showing a clear manifestation of congressional 
intent to preempt state remedies, courts would allow state law 
and state sanctioned remedies to coexist with federal 
requirements.24 Evidence of congressional intent would be 
gleaned from canons of statutory interpretation, the historic 
context of the statute in question, and legislative history.25 
When Congress began to enact more comprehensive 
regulatory programs related to human health and the 
environment in the 1970s, it embraced several mechanisms to 
accentuate the positive attributes of federalism by drawing on 
the unique strengths of state and local governments.26 One 
primary mechanism is cooperative federalism, which has been a 
recurring theme of federalstate relations since at least the late 
1930s but gained prominence with the expansion of federal 
environmental law beginning in 1970.27 Cooperative federalism 
typically entails the establishment of uniform national health or 
technology-based standards that leave state and local 
governments sufficient flexibility to implement those standards 
in ways that reflect local particularities and needs. The two 
dominant models of cooperative federalism adopted by Congress 
either condition the receipt of federal funds on compliance with 
federal standards or, in the alternative, give states a choice 
                                                          
relations); Paul Wolfson, Preemption and Federalism: The Missing Link, 16 HASTINGS 
CONST. L.Q. 69, 95 (1988) (citing Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 
U.S. 707, 715 (1985)) (health); see also Cal. State Auto. Assn Inter-Ins. Bureau v. 
Maloney, 341 U.S. 105, 10910, 109 n.2 (1951) (insurance); Rice, 331 U.S. at 22930 
(agricultural warehousing). 
 23. See Catherine M. Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption: An Institutional 
Approach, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 449, 454 (2008) (finding that the presumption against 
preemption breaks down in the products liability realm, rearing its head with gusto in 
some cases, but oddly quiescent in others). 
 24. N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 
514 U.S. 645, 66567 (1995); Hillsborough County, 471 U.S. at 71518. 
 25. Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 14648 (1963); San 
Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 24044 (1959); Rice, 331 U.S. at 
23234. 
 26. See Douglas T. Kendall, Redefining Federalism, 35 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,445, 
10,446 (2005) (arguing that a more balanced view of federalism by the courts would allow 
appropriate environmental regulation at both the state and federal levels). 
 27. Glicksman, supra note 12, at 719 (citing Symposium on Cooperative Federalism: 
Foreword, 23 IOWA L. REV. 455, 455 (1938)); Robert V. Percival, Environmental 
Federalism: Historical Roots and Contemporary Models, 54 MD. L. REV. 1141, 1174 (1995) 
(describing cooperative federalism as the dominant model of modern environmental law). 
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between regulating in accordance with federal standards or 
having federal regulation preempt state regulation altogether.28 
The second important mechanism is the inclusion of an 
explicit statutory savings clause to avoid displacement of state 
and local law. Savings clauses reflect the congressional desire to 
preserve the presumption against preemption and, more 
generally, maintain state authority and state remedies. Where 
Congress includes a savings clause, it recognizes the need either 
to fill a regulatory void left by federal law or to enhance 
protection for affected communities through complementary 
federal and state authorities. The preemption of state law in 
these areas inevitably causes a regulatory vacuum, where the 
states are prevented from regulating broad spheres of harmful 
activity even though federal regulation is lacking or, in some 
cases, completely absent.29 As a result, both states and their 
residents are worse off than before the passage of federal law.30 
Despite the cooperative federalism trend seen in 
congressional action during the past three decades,31 the Supreme 
Courts preemption decisions have gone in the opposite direction. 
This is so even though the majorities of both the Rehnquist and 
Roberts Courts profess ever stronger allegiance to federalism 
principles, particularly state sovereignty. Whether placed under 
the heading of new federalism,32 real federalism,33 or 
                                                          
 28. Robert V. Percival, Environmental Implications of the Rehnquist Courts New 
Federalism, 17 NAT. RESOURCES & ENVT 3, 52 (2002). 
 29. See Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 222 (2004) (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring) (A series of the Courts decisions has yielded a host of situations in which 
persons adversely affected by ERISA-proscribed wrongdoing cannot gain make-whole 
relief; the majority has created a regulatory vacuum in which [v]irtually all state law 
remedies are preempted but very few federal substitutes are provided.). 
 30. See Albert C. Lin, Erosive Interpretation of Environmental Law in the Supreme 
Courts 200304 Term, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 565, 58485 (2005) (noting that the Courts 
decision in Engine Manufacturers Assn v. South Coast Air Quality Management District, 
541 U.S. 246 (2004), deprived states of a regulatory tool for air quality). 
 31. Glicksman, supra note 12, at 753 (observing that, beginning in 1970, Congress 
built cooperative federalism mechanisms into numerous pollution control laws). 
 32. See Rena I. Steinzor, Unfunded Environmental Mandates and the New (New) 
Federalism: Devolution, Revolution, or Reform?, 81 MINN. L. REV. 97, 11314 (1996) 
(concluding that the new federalism rhetoric that emerged during the Reagan 
Administration had as one of its primary goals radical deregulation, especially in the 
areas of public health, safety, and the environment); see also United States v. Morrison, 
529 U.S. 598, 654 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting) ([N]ot the least irony of these cases [on 
Violence Against Women] [is] that the States will be forced to enjoy the new federalism 
whether they want it or not.). 
 33. See Kendall, supra note 26, at 10,449. Real federalism has come to mean 
protection from regulation regardless of its source. Id. at 10,448 (citing MICHAEL S. 
GREVE, REAL FEDERALISM: WHY IT MATTERS, HOW IT COULD HAPPEN 8182 (1999)). The 
conceptual foundation of real federalism was provided by Richard Epstein, who argued 
that the Court should take aggressive steps to reduce the size of government at all levels. 
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libertarian federalism,34 it seems plain that some sort of 
federalism is on the rise, but the new brand of federalism in recent 
Supreme Court cases is a far cry from Brandeiss happy 
partnership between state and local governments.35 
Collectively, judicial outcomes in the recent preemption 
cases fail to reflect federalisms primary virtue, which lies not in 
a hermetic wall between federal, state, and local governments, 
requiring them to operate in mutually exclusive spheres, but in 
the sometimes cooperative and often competitive interaction 
between governments.36 A dynamic, polyphonic view of 
federalisma workable government where federal, state, tribal, 
and local authorities are appropriately matched with geographic 
and socioeconomic issuesshould encourage stronger, more 
coherent, and more cooperative forms of problem solving and 
leadership.37 
Whether reviewing challenges to state tort law or to state or 
local regulatory programs, the Court has frequently recited the 
mantra that [t]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate 
touchstone in every pre-emption case.38 Yet in relatively few of 
the recent cases have the Rehnquist or Roberts Courts actually 
delved into congressional purposes underlying a particular 
statute in any depth; rather, they limit themselves to often 
ambiguous statutory language and dictionary definitions to 
resolve preemption claims. Likewise, in relatively few cases has 
the Court considered the impact of preemption on cooperative 
federalism objectives or the relative competence of different 
levels of government to solve societal problems. Rather, as 
Professor Roderick Hills points out, preemption cases exhibit a 
type of faux textualism in which the Court invokes the alleged 
plain meaning of two wholly ambiguous words in a statutory 
                                                          
See Richard A. Epstein, Constitutional Faith and the Commerce Clause, 71 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 167, 190 (1996) (advocating rolling back the clock on 200 years of court precedent 
in order to limit the modern regulatory state); Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the 
Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REV. 1387, 1388, 1454 (1987). 
 34. See Kendall, supra note 26, at 10,450. 
 35. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
 36. Hills, supra note 11, at 4. 
 37. See Robert A. Schapiro, From Dualism to Polyphony, in PREEMPTION CHOICE: 
THE THEORY, LAW, AND REALITY OF FEDERALISMS CORE QUESTION 33, 4344 (William W. 
Buzbee ed., 2008) (positing that, under polyphonic federalism, federal and state power are 
presumptively concurrent, and the focus becomes managing the overlapping areas in a 
productive and equitable fashion). 
 38. See, e.g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (quoting Retail Clerks 
Intl Assn, Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963)); Cipollone v. Liggett 
Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992); Gade v. Natl Solid Wastes Mgmt. Assn, 505 U.S. 
88, 96 (1992); Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504 (1978). 
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clause to reach antiregulatory results.39 A closer look at cases 
involving explicit statutory savings clauses lends some support to 
this theory.40 
When it comes to preemption, however, the Justices split in 
ways that cut across ideological lines. Champions of federalism 
and states rights, like Justice Scalia and former Justices 
Rehnquist and OConnor, do not always vote against preemption 
of state laws, while champions of strong central government, like 
Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Souter, do not always 
vote in favor of preemption.41 As a result, Supreme Court 
opinions seem to oscillate between a love of federalism, which 
would suggest a restrictive view of preemption, and an aversion 
to state interference with federal programs.42 It is tempting to 
surmise that the preemption cases are not about federalism at all 
but rather reflect promarket, antiregulatory goals.43 Perhaps 
hostility toward government regulation at any level is in fact in 
play, but it is difficult to discern a clear pattern to this effect in 
the preemption cases viewed as a whole. In some cases, state law 
remedies and state and local regulatory initiatives are applauded 
and in others they are excoriated.44 
                                                          
 39. See Hills, supra note 11, at 9; David B. Spence & Paula Murray, The Law, 
Economics, and Politics of Federal Preemption Jurisprudence: A Quantitative Analysis, 87 
CAL. L. REV. 1125, 114950 (1999) (noting the inconsistency of preemption decisions and 
their apparent lack of correlation to textual differences). 
 40. See infra Parts IIIIV (observing that state common law tort regimes are 
generally upheld, while state regulatory innovations are generally struck down on 
preemption grounds). 
 41. Hills, supra note 11, at 34; see also Greve & Klick, supra note 3, at 7980 
(finding that, with the exception of Justice Thomas, the voting records of the liberal 
justices (those in favor of strong, uniform federal regulations) and conservative justices 
(those that express pro-federalism, pro-state, and antiregulatory opinions) in the 
preemption cases are a near mirror image of the voting records in federalism cases, but 
that voting alignments are substantially more fluid in preemption cases than in other 
federalism cases); Bradley W. Joondeph, The Deregulatory Valence of Justice OConnors 
Federalism, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 507, 511 (2007) (OConnor voted to limit regulation as 
frequently as she voted to enhance state autonomy.). 
 42. See Hills, supra note 11, at 8 (The struggle over preemption is, in large part, a 
struggle between proponents of markets and proponents of regulation.). 
 43. Id. at 89; Steinzor, supra note 32, at 11114 (describing new federalism as a 
strategy to eliminate big government in Washington); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The 
Conservative Paths of the Rehnquist Courts Federalism Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 
429, 46263 (2002) (noting that, between 1989 and 1999, 22 of the 35 preemption cases 
issued by the Rehnquist Court, including all seven preemption cases in 1999, found in 
favor of preemption). 
 44. See Greve & Klick, supra note 3, at 49, 68 (finding that no clear antiregulatory 
sentiment could be discerned from 105 preemption cases issued by the Rehnquist Court 
through 2003). For discussion of the Greve and Klick report, see infra notes 4852 and 
accompanying text. 
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In general, in the four areas assessed in this Article, when 
Congress included an explicit savings clause, state tort law fared 
better than state regulatory programs through the Rehnquist 
years (19862005). Supreme Court opinions tended to apply the 
savings clause and preserve state tort remedies and, in many of 
these cases, a theme of deference to the states historic police 
powers can be seen.45 If Riegel is any indication, however, this 
phenomenon will be less pronounced or perhaps completely 
eviscerated in the Roberts Court, but it is too early and there 
have been too few relevant cases to draw anything but tentative 
conclusions.46 
When one focuses on challenges to state and local regulatory 
programs, Supreme Court jurisprudence of the Rehnquist and 
Roberts Courts exhibits a palpable pro-preemption pattern, 
where the presence of a savings clause has not been given much 
weight. In these cases, judicial outcomes do in fact appear to be 
driven by a results-oriented, antiregulatory sentiment rather 
than by the overarching congressional objectives expressed in the 
federal statute at issue.47 
To a certain extent, this observation bucks the conclusions of 
Michael Greve and Jonathan Klick, who conducted an empirical 
assessment of all the statutory preemption decisions of the 
Rehnquist Court between 1986 and 2003, and concluded that the 
Court was much more likely to find against preemption in cases 
where the state was a party, as is often (but not always) the case 
when a regulatory program is challenged.48 The authors 
concluded that, although business interests did well against 
private parties, they could not catch a break when a state was 
                                                          
 45. See infra Part III.E. 
 46. See infra notes 15395 (discussing Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 
1007, 1011 (2008), which held that plaintiffs state tort claims were preempted by the 
Medical Device Amendments of 1976). 
 47. See infra Part IV.E (explaining the interaction between state and federal law in 
regulatory cases involving preemption and savings clauses). 
 48. Greve & Klick, supra note 3, at 66. Regulatory cases include challenges to both 
state regulatory programs where the state is a party and local regulatory cases where the 
state is not directly involved. For an example of the latter, see Engine Mfrs. Assn v. S. 
Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 246, 24849 (2004), in which the State of 
California filed an amicus brief on behalf of an air quality management district and 
against preemption. See Brief for the State of California as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Respondents, Engine Mfrs. Assn, 541 U.S. 246 (No. 02-1343). Despite Californias 
arguments that [t]o protect the health of [amici states] residents and the strength of 
their economies, states need to be able to use the most varied and effective tools . . . to 
attack some of the worst air pollution problems in the nation, id. at 1, the Court 
invalidated the districts regulation. Engine Mfrs. Assn, 541 U.S. at 258. The Engine 
Manufacturers case is examined in Part IV.A.2, infra. 
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either a petitioner or a respondent.49 According to Greve and 
Klick, [W]hen states insist upon their right to regulate business 
over and above a federal baseline, the Court will often give them 
their due.50 They found that, of the 32 tort cases (out of a total of 
105 preemption cases handed down during the period of 
analysis), the Rehnquist Court found the plaintiffs claims 
preempted in 20 cases, or 62.5%.51 Despite this relatively poor 
track record, Greve and Klick concluded that an assumption of 
judicial bias against tort claims is likely unwarranted; rather, 
the lack of state participation in the tort cases was a 
determinative factor.52 When the subset of cases is narrowed to 
the four areas of concern explored in this Article and to 
challenges involving statutory savings clauses, the results are 
still mixed, but to the extent that a judicial preemption trend can 
be discerned it appears to cut in favor of tort claims and against 
regulatory programs. 
                                                          
 49. Greve & Klick, supra note 3, at 6768. 
 50. Id. at 68; see also Alexandra B. Klass, State Innovation and Preemption: Lessons 
from State Climate Change Efforts, 41 LOY. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 39, 
on file with the Houston Law Review) ([C]ourts should create a preemption 
jurisprudence that places more express weight on state efforts to protect the interests of 
their citizens and natural resources through innovative regulatory and common law 
actions [and make the] special status of state action an explicit . . . part of the analysis.); 
Bradford Mank, Should States Have Greater Standing Rights than Ordinary Citizens?: 
Massachusetts v. EPAs New Standing Test for States, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1701, 1708 
(2008) ([T]he Court has historically given states preferential status in federal courts 
when a state files a parens patriae suit based on the states quasi-sovereign interest in 
the health and welfare of its citizens or [its] natural resources . . . .). 
 51. Greve & Klick, supra note 3, at 52. In some of these cases, plaintiffs claims 
were only partially preempted. Id. at 55. In comparison, 47.9% of the non-tort cases 
studied during this timeframe resulted in preemption. Id. at 52. Greve and Klick note 
that preemption of tort cases occurred more frequently during the second Rehnquist 
Court, 19942005, while the frequency of preemption in non-tort cases stayed about the 
same. Id. at 52. The delineation between the first and second Rehnquist Courts is marked 
by the appointment of Justice Ginsburg in 1993 and of Justice Breyer in 1994, but a more 
significant ideological change occurred in 1991, when Justice Thomas replaced Justice 
Marshall. From 1994 to 2004, the Courts composition was unchanged. Id. at 49. For an 
assessment of the composition of the Rehnquist Court, see Thomas W. Merrill, The 
Making of the Second Rehnquist Court: A Preliminary Analysis, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 569, 
64344 (2003), which questions the assumption that the Chief Justice is responsible for 
setting institutional norms and discusses the impact of Justice Scalia on the Courts 
certiorari policy. 
 52. Greve & Klick, supra note 3, at 53. Greve and Klick also found that, where 
many states join together to file an amici brief, their participation is likely to result in an 
antipreemptive result, whereas if only a few states participate as amici, they are unlikely 
to effect the outcome. Id. at 71. They conclude that the number of signatories may signal 
both the intensity and the authenticity of the states concern as a true federalism 
interest, as opposed to a parochial and opportunistic interest in a particular outcome. Id. 
at 72. 
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III. STATE COMMON LAW 
Most federal public health and environmental statutes 
neither preclude nor independently authorize private recovery of 
compensatory damages for personal injury or property damage. 
Although some federal statutes authorize citizens suits as a 
supplemental enforcement scheme, they only allow injunctions 
and the assessment of civil penalties payable to the federal 
treasury, not to the private plaintiff.53 As a result, individuals 
seeking compensation for harm caused by a federally regulated 
activity are limited to whatever relief is provided by state law. 
Even where federal law addresses the harmful activity through 
comprehensive, prescriptive regulations and prohibitions, state 
common law serves as an important gap filler. It not only 
provides for compensatory and punitive damages in cases where 
relief would otherwise be unavailable, it also operates to bring 
information to light about the product or activity in question 
through discovery and trial.54 Tort law represents differentyet 
complementaryvalues than public law. Societal norms of 
reciprocity, distributive justice, morality, and punishment for 
careless or malicious deeds undergird tort law.55 In addition, tort 
remedies foster economic efficiency by forcing the entity engaging 
in risky activities to internalize the costs of harm otherwise 
imposed on others.56 Once internalized, those costs will be 
reflected in the prices of the products produced by the risky 
activity, and consumers will receive a more accurate signal of the 
                                                          
 53. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 136136y (2006) (providing no private right of action for harms 
caused by pesticides); 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2006) (providing no right to compensatory 
damages under the Clean Water Act); 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8 (2000) (providing no right to 
compensatory damages under the Safe Drinking Water Act); 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (2000) 
(providing no right to compensatory damages under the Clean Air Act); 42 U.S.C. § 9607 
(2000) (providing no right to compensatory damages for injuries due to releases of 
hazardous substances). 
 54. Klass, supra note 19, at 56970; Wendy E. Wagner, When All Else Fails: 
Regulating Risky Products Through Tort Litigation 3 (Univ. of Tex. Pub. Law & Legal 
Theory, Paper No. 99, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=902412; see also 
Thomas O. McGarity, RegulationCommon Law Feedback Loop in Nonpreemptive 
Regimes, in PREEMPTION CHOICE: THE THEORY, LAW, AND REALITY OF FEDERALISMS CORE 
QUESTION, supra note 37, at 235, 24552 (describing the informational function served by 
tort litigation over chemicals used to make Teflon, and noting that the regulatory agency 
did not have access to the relevant information, which ultimately led to a phase-out of the 
chemical, until plaintiffs provided it). 
 55. Klass, supra note 19, at 54950, 552; see also Betsy J. Grey, The New 
Federalism Jurisprudence and National Tort Reform, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 475, 522
23 (2002). 
 56. Robert L. Glicksman, Federal Preemption and Private Legal Remedies for 
Pollution, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 121, 194 (1985); see also David C. Vladeck, Preemption and 
Regulatory Failure, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 95, 101 (2005) (identifying the threat of liability as 
an important source of market discipline). 
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true costs of production, enabling them to make better 
purchasing decisions.57 If damage awards make the costs of the 
existing practice too high to continue as is, the producer will be 
motivated to improve the product or take it off the market. 
With some exceptions where Congress has included a 
savings clause, the post-New Deal twentieth century Supreme 
Court opinions have generally accepted supplemental state law 
remedies as consistent with congressional objectives to protect 
health and welfare. Although the pattern is not wholly 
consistent, a broad array of tort claims for injuries caused by air 
and water pollution, radiation poisoning, workplace injuries, 
dangerous products, and pesticide use have been allowed to 
proceed. Conversely, tort claims have been displaced where the 
relevant statute lacks a savings clause or where it includes a 
preemption clause that could be said to neutralize the savings 
clause. The most recent cases issued by the Roberts Court, in 
particular, exhibit an alarming tendency to read preemption 
clauses, but not savings clauses, broadly, even in cases involving 
tort claims. 
A. Environment and Energy 
1. Air and Water Pollution. Air and water pollution are 
governed by a cooperative federalism framework intended to 
respect states police powers to protect public health and safety 
within their borders, but also to authorize uniform federal 
standards that transcend state lines.58 State tort law remedies for 
harm caused by pollutants have long been an important part of 
the cooperative federalism formula. Climate change litigation is 
currently putting this approach to the test. Few would contest 
that climate change has become the most pressing environmental 
problem in the world.59 Existing federal statutes, enacted long 
                                                          
 57. Glicksman, supra note 56, at 194. 
 58. Percival, supra note 27, at 1174; see also Glicksman, supra note 12, at 71920. 
Professor Glicksman notes, however, that in recent years the model of cooperative 
federalism reflected in federal environmental and natural resource management 
legislation has faltered, not flourished as courts, Congress, and federal administrative 
agencies have placed significant obstacles in the path of state or local efforts to pick up 
the slack created by the federal governments withdrawal from its previous role as prime 
environmental policymaker. Id. at 802. Doctrines employed by the Court to obstruct state 
and local efforts include preemption, the dormant Commerce Clause, and regulatory 
takings. Id. 
 59. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 145556 (2007) (concluding that 
immediate steps to control GHG emissions are necessary to avoid severe and irreversible 
changes to natural ecosystems); WORKING GROUP II, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON 
CLIMATE CHANGE, FOURTH REPORT, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND 
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before anyone recognized that warming trends were exacerbated 
by greenhouse gas emissions from industrial activities, provide 
only the most rudimentary tools to combat climate change. Most 
recently, dozens of states and cities, increasingly frustrated with 
the federal governments failure to curb emissions through 
regulatory means, have brought common law nuisance claims 
against power plants and automobile manufacturers in hopes of 
combating global warming.60 These claims are proving to be a 
catalyst for governmental action, at least at the state and local 
level, but they can only be successful if they are saved from 
preemption. 
Power plants and automobile manufacturers have asserted 
that tort claims to remedy greenhouse gas emissions are 
preempted, but precedent generally cuts the other way. State and 
local governments historically grappled with air pollution 
problems through smoke abatement ordinances and the like, and 
air pollution prevention falls squarely within states traditional 
police powers of protecting their citizens health.61 The Clean Air 
Act expressly states the congressional intent that air pollution 
prevention . . . and air pollution control at its source is the 
primary responsibility of States and local governments.62 It 
comes as no surprise, then, that perhaps more than any other 
federal statute the Clean Air Act is peppered with savings 
                                                          
VULNERABILITY 9 (2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/ar4-wg2.htm (finding 
that global warming is likely not due solely to natural causes); see also Thomas W. 
Merrill, Global Warming as a Public Nuisance, 30 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 293, 29394 (2005) 
(discussing the obstacles to successful climate change litigation brought by state attorney 
generals); cf. Klass, supra note 50, at 34 (examining common law claims for relief as well 
as state regulatory efforts to control greenhouse gas emissions to illustrate todays 
almost complete linkage between the common law of tort and the regulatory state in areas 
of public health, safety, and environmental protection). 
 60. See, e.g., California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755, 2007 WL 2726871, at 
*1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007) (granting automobile manufacturers motion to dismiss 
public nuisance claims); Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 274 
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (dismissing certain claims against power plants without reaching the 
preemption issue, finding a nonjusticiable political question consigned to the political 
branches); see also Kirsten H. Engel, Climate Change Litigation (Other than Under the 
Clean Air Act), in GLOBAL WARMING: CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE LAW COURSEBOOK (ALI
ABA) 14146 (2007) (describing public nuisance claims raised in climate change cases); 
Merrill, supra note 59, at 316, 319 (concluding that federal common law regarding air 
pollution as a nuisance is most likely displaced by the Clean Air Act); James Kanter, 
Fighting Climate Change, One Lawsuit at a Time, INTL HERALD TRIB., Aug. 15, 2007, at 
12 (describing a spate of cases pending in the United States and Europe that attempt to 
hold companies who emit greenhouse gases responsible for global warming). 
 61. Train v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60, 64 (1975); Huron Portland 
Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 442 (1960); Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 
230, 238 (1907). 
 62. 42 U.S.C. § 7401(a)(3) (2000); see also Train, 421 U.S. at 64 (quoting the Air 
Quality Act of 1967). 
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clauses.63 Many courts have allowed tort recovery for harms 
caused by air pollutants as supplemental to the statutory and 
administrative requirements of the Clean Air Act.64 
The Supreme Court has not yet had occasion to address the 
preemptive effect of the Clean Air Act in this context,65 but it has 
reconciled common law tort claims with the Clean Water Act, 
which has a similar legislative background and contains a 
similar savings clause.66 Some of the earliest preemption battles 
over pollution involved the Clean Water Act, aimed at restoring 
and maintaining the chemical, biological, and physical integrity 
of the nations waterways.67 As one means of accomplishing this 
goal, Congress included several savings clauses to preserve 
common law claims, preserve the states ability to impose more 
protective pollution control requirements, and establish and 
enforce rights to allocate and use water resources.68 
In the early days after enactment, it appeared that these 
savings clauses preserved both federal and state common law 
claims for harm caused by water pollution. The door was 
slammed shut on the use of federal common law as a remedy for 
interstate pollution, however, in City of Milwaukee v. Illinois.69 
The State of Illinois asserted a federal common law nuisance 
claim against Wisconsin cities for dumping untreated sewage 
into Lake Michigan. The lower courts agreed that federal 
common law required the defendants to treat their sewage more 
stringently than compelled by the Clean Water Act, emphasizing 
                                                          
 63. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7604(e), 7412(d)(7), 7416 (2000). 
 64. See, e.g., Her Majesty The Queen in Right of the Province of Ont. v. City of 
Detroit, 874 F.2d 332, 34243 (6th Cir. 1989) (enabling Michigan state courts to both 
establish and enforce state emissions standards alongside the Clean Air Act); North 
Carolina ex rel. Cooper v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 439 F. Supp. 2d 486, 49697 (W.D.N.C. 
2006) (addressing direct state regulation of federal facilities for air pollution purposes); In 
re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether Prods. Liab. Litig., 341 F. Supp. 2d 386, 406, 40911 
(S.D.N.Y 2004) (allowing state tort claims on the grounds that the claims were aimed at 
controlling the behavior by the defendants rather than attempting to regulate the actual 
fuel products); Gutierrez v. Mobil Oil Corp., 798 F. Supp. 1280, 128182, 128485 (W.D. 
Tex. 1992) (reasoning that allowing the Clean Air Act to preempt state tort actions would 
prevent plaintiffs from recovering deserved compensatory relief); United States v. 
AtlanticRichfield Co., 478 F. Supp. 1215, 121920 (D. Mont. 1979) (finding the Clean Air 
Act devoid of any intent to bar common law tort claims). 
 65. The Court has, however, ordered the EPA to take steps to regulate GHGs under 
the Clean Air Act, Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1463 (2007), and it has 
preempted Californias regulatory efforts to control emissions from automobiles, Engine 
Mfrs. Assn v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 246, 252, 255 (2004). The latter 
case is examined in Part IV.A.2, infra. 
 66. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251, 1370 (2006). 
 67. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2006). 
 68. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251(g), 1365(e), 1370 (2006). 
 69. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee II), 451 U.S. 304, 31719 (1981). 
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the expansive nature of the savings clause: [N]othing in the 
section shall restrict any right which any person . . . may have 
under any statute or common law to seek enforcement of any 
effluent standard or limitation or to seek any other relief . . . .70 
The Supreme Court reversed. Despite the explicit savings clause, 
the Court believed that interstate pollution must be addressed by 
federal regulatory standards only, not federal common law.71 The 
decision failed to give weight to either the plain language of the 
savings clause, which makes no distinction between federal and 
state rights but preserves any common law right, or to 
congressional intent to preserve all types of supplemental 
remedies to ensure accomplishment of statutory goals.72 Rather 
than giving full effect to the statutory language, the Court 
articulated a myopic view that, in a case involving one state 
against polluters in another state, a presumption in favor of 
displacement of federal common law was consistent with the 
long-standing presumption against displacement of state 
common law.73 
The foreclosure of federal common law to rectify harms 
caused by federally regulated activities makes the preservation of 
state common law all the more important. Subsequently, in 
International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, the Supreme Court 
confirmed that state common law was still a viable avenue for 
redressing interstate water pollution.74 Once again, however, it 
read the savings clause narrowly in concluding that only the law 
of the source state (New York), not the affected state (Vermont), 
would be applied. The Court believed that this limitation was 
necessary to ensure that the regulatory decisions of the source 
state were respected, thereby ensuring that economically 
beneficial activities in one state would be impervious to 
complaints by other, often competing, states.75 
The results in both Illinois and International Paper may 
seem like a simple and none-too-troubling choice of law issue 
rather than a federalism issue. Indeed, on remand in 
International Paper, the district court allowed Vermonts claims 
for both water and air pollution to go forward under New York 
                                                          
 70. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 599 F.2d 151, 163 (7th Cir. 1979) (quoting 33 
U.S.C. § 1365(e) (2000)), vacated, 451 U.S. 304 (1981). 
 71. Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 319. 
 72. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e) (2006); see also Glicksman, supra note 56, at 163, 179 n.331 
(characterizing Justice Rehnquists opinion as unsupported speculation). 
 73. Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 31617. 
 74. Intl Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 497 (1987). 
 75. Id. at 49697 (quoting Illinois v. City of Milwaukee (Milwaukee III), 731 F.2d 
403, 414 (7th Cir. 1984)). 
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common law,76 and the paper mill was required to pay a 
$5 million settlement and establish a trust fund for 
environmental projects in the area.77 But the apparent proclivity 
in favor of preemption demonstrated by these two cases 
improperly imposes the burden of showing Congresss intent to 
preserve state remedies on the party arguing against 
preemption, which runs counter to the long-standing 
presumption against preemption as well as Congresss 
overarching goals of eliminating water pollution and maintaining 
the states ability to impose more stringent requirements to 
effectuate that goal.78 
Preemption has also been asserted to shield polluters from 
liability for oil spills in interstate waters, but state law remedies 
have been preserved. The most significant oil spill case arose out 
of the 1989 wreck of the Exxon Valdez near the Alaska coast.79 
The wreck and the resulting public outcry prompted Congress to 
enact the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA).80 The OPA integrated a 
mélange of provisions governing tanker vessels by imposing 
federal design requirements and penalties for spills.81 Various 
bills related to oil spills had been considered prior to the passage 
of the OPA, but preemption had been a major sticking point.82 In 
fact, preemption was discussed by the Senate Environment and 
Public Works Committee more than any other single issue,83 
and it was the primary point of contention between the Senate 
and the House of Representatives.84 In the end, Congress 
preserved the states ability to respond to oil spills through two 
savings clauses. The first is concerned with cleanup: Nothing in 
                                                          
 76. Ouellette v. Intl Paper Co., 666 F. Supp. 58, 62 (D. Vt. 1987). 
 77. Klass, supra note 19, at 565. 
 78. See Richard E. Levy & Robert L. Glicksman, Judicial Activism and Restraint in 
the Supreme Courts Environmental Law Decisions, 42 VAND. L. REV. 343, 40102 (1989) 
(dissecting the Courts rationale for undermining the presumption against preemption). 
The presumption is described at supra notes 2025 and accompanying text. 
 79. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2611 (2008). 
 80. 33 U.S.C. §§ 27012761 (2006). 
 81. In particular, the OPA amended the Comprehensive Emergency Response, 
Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (2000), and the Clean Water 
Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (2006). 
 82. Craig H. Allen, Federalism in the Era of International Standards: Federal and 
State Government Regulation of Merchant Vessels in the United States (Part II), 29 J. 
MAR. L. & COM. 565, 60708 (1998). 
 83. S. REP. NO. 101-94, at 17 (1989); see also Russell V. Randle, The Oil Pollution 
Act of 1990: Its Provisions, Intent, and Effects, 21 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,119, 10,133 (1991). 
 84. Randle, supra note 83, at 10,133; see also Walter B. Jones, Oil Spill 
Compensation and Liability Legislation: When Good Things Dont Happen to Good Bills, 
19 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,333 (1989) (noting that various House versions would have 
preempted state law entirely). 
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this Act . . . shall . . . be construed . . . as preempting[ ] the 
authority of any State . . . from imposing any additional liability 
or requirements with respect to the discharge of oil . . . or any 
removal activities in connection with such a discharge.85 The 
second relates to liability and penalties: 
Nothing in this Act . . . shall in any way affect, or be 
construed to affect, the authority of the United States or 
any State . . . to impose additional liability or additional 
requirements; or to impose, or to determine the amount of, 
any fine or penalty . . . for any violation of law; relating to 
the discharge, or substantial threat of a discharge, of oil.86 
Since 1990, the federal courts have generally found that the 
OPA does not preempt tort claims for damages to fisheries, oyster 
beds, water fowl, and other natural resources affected by oil 
spills.87 
As for the Exxon Valdez, after months of trial, a jury 
awarded billions of dollars in compensatory and punitive 
damages under Alaska law to fishermen and landowners injured 
by the oil spill.88 Because the OPA does not apply retroactively to 
pre-1990 spills, Exxon invoked the Clean Water Act and federal 
admiralty law in an attempt to preempt common law damages 
awards.89 In rejecting these contentions, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit gave weight to the Clean Water 
Acts savings clause, and reasoned that the absence of a federal 
private right of action could more reasonably be construed as 
leaving private claims intact than as implicitly destroying them.90 
                                                          
 85. 33 U.S.C. § 2718(a) (2006). 
 86. 33 U.S.C. § 2718(c) (2006). 
 87. See, e.g., Clausen v. M/V New Carissa, 171 F. Supp. 2d 1127, 1133 (D. Or. 2001) 
(oyster beds); Williams v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 115 F. Supp. 2d 561, 565 (D. Md. 
2000) (damage to land adjacent to river); Dostie Dev., Inc. v. Arctic Peace Shipping Co., 
No. 95-808-CIV-J-MMP, 1996 WL 866119, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 14, 1996) (damage to land 
adjacent to river); cf. Natl Shipping Co. of Saudi Arabia v. Moran Mid-Atl. Corp., 924 F. 
Supp. 1436, 144648 (E.D. Va. 1996), affd, 122 F.3d 1062 (4th Cir. 1997) (per curiam), 
cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1021 (1998) (rejecting plaintiffs argument that the OPA allowed 
recovery in excess of the statutory limit and concluding that the OPA preserves state law 
claims for those damaged by the spill but not for other responsible parties seeking 
contribution claims from third parties). 
 88. In re Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d 1215, 1225 (9th Cir. 2001), vacated sub nom. 
Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008). For arguments that the punitive 
damages award against Exxon was appropriate and necessary, see Alexandra Klass & 
Sandra Zellmer, Exxon Should Just Pay Its Penance, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., Feb. 29, 
2008; Posting of Alexandra Klass & Sandra Zellmer, Fishermen are Entitled to Punitive 
Damages from Exxon, to American Constitution Society Blog, http://www.acsblog.org/ 
guest-bloggers-fishermen-are-entitled-to-punitive-damages-from-exxon.html (Feb. 27, 
2008, 11:06 AM). 
 89. Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d at 1226, 1228. 
 90. Id. at 1231. 
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The Supreme Court affirmed, but reduced the amount of punitive 
damages under federal maritime law.91 
Exxon and other members of the petrochemical industry 
played a major role in seeking federal preemption under another 
environmental cleanup statute, the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act 
(CERCLA or Superfund).92 After years of opposing a federal 
cleanup program, the industry ultimately supported CERCLA, 
largely out of a desire to preempt non-uniform and increasingly 
rigorous state requirements.93 Shortly after enactment, the 
Rehnquist Court concluded that CERCLA preempted state 
taxation intended to pay for hazardous waste cleanup, based on 
its perception that Congress wished to avoid the potentially 
adverse effects of overtaxation on the competitiveness of the 
American petrochemical industry.94 In response to states 
concerns, however, Congress overturned the Courts holding in 
the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986.95 
The Senate Report explained that the amendments were 
intended to remove a potential barrier to the creation of State 
superfund programs and to stimulate the number and pace of 
hazardous substance response actions undertaken or partially 
funded by States.96 Taking their cue from the 1986 amendments, 
most federal appellate courts have found that Congress did not 
intend for CERCLA to occupy the field of hazardous waste 
cleanup or otherwise prevent states from supplementing federal 
cleanup requirements with either regulatory or common law 
responses.97 
                                                          
 91. Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S. Ct. at 263334. The Court reduced the award from 
$2.5 billion to $500 million to reflect a one-to-one ratio between punitive and 
compensatory damages. According to Professor Benjamin Zipursky, The case reflects a 
combination of the court's pro-business willingness to cut punitive damages quite sharply, 
its disinclination to spare Exxon all punitive damages in today's political environment, 
and its occasional capacity to resolve disagreement by striking a bargain. Warren Richey, 
High Court Slashes Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Damages, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 26, 
2008, at 10. 
 92. 42 U.S.C. §§ 96019675 (2000). 
 93. J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Timing and Form of Federal Regulation: The 
Case of Climate Change, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1499, 1508 n.22 (2007). 
 94. Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355, 37172 (1986). 
 95. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 
§ 114, 100 Stat. 1613, 1652 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9614 (2000)); see also Manor 
Care, Inc. v. Yaskin, 950 F.2d 122, 12526 (3d Cir. 1991) (citing the 1986 amendments in 
holding that CERCLA does not preempt the New Jersey Spill Act, which required a 
responsible party to pay for the states share of cleanup costs). The Manor Care opinion 
was written by Justice Samuel Alito, then an appellate judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit. 
 96. S. REP. NO. 99-11, at 5960 (1985). 
 97. See, e.g., Firemans Fund Ins. Co. v. City of Lodi, 302 F.3d 928, 94143 (9th Cir. 
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As for common law claims, CERCLA expressly provides that 
[n]othing in this chapter shall affect or modify in any way the 
obligations or liabilities of any person under other Federal or 
State law, including common law, with respect to releases of 
hazardous substances or other pollutants or contaminants.98 The 
statute does, however, prevent double recovery by precluding 
plaintiffs from recovering damages under both CERCLA and 
state law.99 
2. Nuclear Plants. In a case that gained notoriety from the 
movie Silkwood,100 Karen Silkwoods estate sought recovery for 
injuries caused by her exposure to plutonium while working at 
KerrMcGees federally licensed nuclear plant.101 In its 1984 
opinion, the Burger Court, in a 54 opinion with Rehnquist in the 
majority, rejected KerrMcGees argument that state-authorized 
awards of punitive damages should be preempted because they 
would punish conduct related to radiation hazards, an area 
within the exclusive domain of the Atomic Energy Act (AEA).102 
                                                          
2002) (finding that CERCLAs savings clause granted supplemental powers to both states 
and smaller communities); PMC, Inc. v. SherwinWilliams Co., 151 F.3d 610, 61718 (7th 
Cir. 1998) (noting that CERCLA was not intended to prevent state common law claims); 
Bedford Affiliates v. Sills, 156 F.3d 416, 42627 (2d Cir. 1998) (determining that while 
supplemental cleanup measures are allowable, state law restitution and indemnification 
claims conflict with and are thus preempted by CERCLA); United States v. Akzo Coatings 
of Am., Inc., 949 F.2d 1409, 1455 (6th Cir. 1991) (noting that Congress contemplated the 
existence of state environmental laws alongside federal environmental laws); Manor Care, 
950 F.2d at 12526 (examining amendments to CERCLA to determine that Congress had 
no intention of barring state supplementation of federal hazardous waste cleanup). But 
see infra note 99 (discussing New Mexico v. Gen. Elec. Co., 467 F.3d 1223 (10th Cir. 
2006)). 
 98. 42 U.S.C. § 9652(d) (2000). 
 99. 42 U.S.C. § 9614(b) (2000). The Tenth Circuit expressed concerns about double 
recovery in holding that a states public nuisance and negligence claims for damages for 
groundwater contamination conflicted with, and thus were preempted by, CERCLA. New 
Mexico v. Gen. Elec. Co., 467 F.3d 1223, 1246, 1248 (10th Cir. 2006). The court 
recognized, Given the[ ] saving clauses, as well as the spirit of cooperative 
federalism . . . Congress did not intend CERCLA to completely preempt state laws related 
to hazardous waste contamination. Id. at 1244, 1246. Even though Congress did not 
intend to wipe out peoples rights inadvertently, with the possible consequence of making 
the intended beneficiaries of the legislation worse off than before it was enacted, the 
court held that nuisance and negligence claims conflicted with statutory provisions for 
natural resource damages. Id. at 1247. Notably, the decision does not preclude claims for 
residual damage or loss of use that are limited to restoration and replacement of natural 
resources if an ongoing CERCLA remedy does not address the contaminant or injury at 
issue. James G. Derouin et al., Recent Tenth Circuit Decision on Natural Resource 
Damages is a Mixed Bag, ABA ENVTL. LIT. & TOXIC TORTS COMMITTEE NEWSL., Apr. 2007, 
at 16, 18. 
 100.  See SILKWOOD (ABC Motion Pictures 1983). 
 101. Silkwood v. KerrMcGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 24143 (1984). 
 102. Id. at 249; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2021(c)(4) (2000) (giving the Commission 
exclusive regulatory power over the disposal of such . . . nuclear material as the 
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Congress gave the relationship between federal and state 
law close attention in the debates preceding passage of the AEA, 
and it ultimately adopted a pervasive federal regulatory scheme 
to ensure the safe operation of nuclear plants.103 Accordingly, the 
Act preempted state safety laws but explicitly preserved other 
state regulatory authorities in two separate savings clauses.104 
Although neither of these clauses applies directly to common law 
claims, subsequent statutory amendments in the PriceAnderson 
Act more clearly evidenced the intent not to displace state tort 
law by placing a cap on liability for nuclear meltdowns.105 
While noting that none of these provisions offered a 
definitive resolution to KerrMcGees preemption challenge, the 
Supreme Court looked to them nonetheless as evidence of 
congressional intent to preserve state tort remedies, including 
Silkwoods punitive damage award.106 Not only was there no 
irreconcilable conflict between the federal and state 
requirements, the Court concluded that preemption of common 
law remedies would be especially inappropriate given that no 
federal remedies existed for persons injured by radiation 
exposure.107 
In the years following the Silkwood opinion, the Rehnquist 
Court reaffirmed its holding by allowing workers compensation 
claims and tort claims for retaliation and intentional infliction of 
emotional distress against nuclear power plants.108 These 
opinions demonstrate that state tort remedies continue to play a 
viable role even in areas subject to comprehensive federal 
regulation, such as nuclear power. 
                                                          
Commission determines . . . should, because of the hazards or potential hazards thereof, 
not be so disposed of without a license from the Commission). 
 103. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Commn, 461 
U.S. 190, 20408, 211 (1983). 
 104. See infra notes 25053 and accompanying text (discussing 42 U.S.C. §§ 2018, 
2021(k)). 
 105. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 85-256, 71 Stat. 576, 576 (1957) (codified 
as amended in 42 U.S.C. § 2012 (2000)). 
 106. Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 25152, 256. 
 107. Id. at 251, 256. 
 108. See English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 80, 8386 (1990) (finding that a claim 
for intentional infliction of emotional distress fell outside of the preempted field of nuclear 
regulation); Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller, 486 U.S. 174, 18384, 186 (1988) (allowing 
workers compensation claims for workers at federal facilities). In El Paso Natural Gas Co. 
v. Neztsosie, 526 U.S. 473, 48788 (1999), however, the Supreme Court remanded for a 
determination whether claims for personal injury and wrongful death brought by 
uranium miners in Navajo Tribal Court constituted public liability action[s] arising out 
of or resulting from a nuclear incident so as to be subject to the PriceAnderson Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 2210(n)(2) (2000), which does not preempt such claims but caps them and 
provides for their removal to federal court. 
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B. Workplaces 
One of the few areas where savings clauses are consistently 
given full effect involves tort claims arising from workplace 
hazards. Congress was motivated to pass the Occupational Safety 
and Health Act of 1970 in response to a veritable epidemic of 
industrial injuries and deaths.109 While debating the bill, 
congressional members observed that more Americans died at 
work in a span of just four years than in Vietnam in a decade.110 
The purpose of the Act is to provide safe and healthful working 
conditions.111 To accomplish this goal, Congress authorized the 
Secretary of Labor, through the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (OSHA), to promulgate and enforce health and 
safety standards for workplaces.112 Employers are required to 
comply with the standards as well as a generalized duty to 
provide a workplace free from recognized hazards that are 
causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm.113 
Since its creation, OSHA has been the subject of criticism 
from both sides of the aisle.114 Employers complain that OSHAs 
regulations are too expensive and too intrusive, while advocates 
of workplace safety argue that the agencys standards and 
enforcement efforts are far too weak.115 To fill the enforcement 
gap, local prosecutors and injured workers have stepped in, filing 
lawsuits under state law for industrial injuries and deaths.116 
Like most federal health and welfare statutes, the Act is 
designed to prevent injuries rather than to compensate victims 
for harm.117 Accordingly, Congress explicitly saved common law 
and statutory rights to ensure redress: Nothing . . . shall be 
construed . . . to enlarge or diminish or affect in any other 
manner the common law or statutory rights, duties, or liabilities 
of employers and employees under any law with respect to 
injuries, diseases, or death of employees arising out of, or in the 
course of, employment.118 
                                                          
 109. Note, Getting Away with Murder: Federal OSHA Preemption of State Criminal 
Prosecutions for Industrial Accidents, 101 HARV. L. REV. 535, 537 (1987). 
 110. Id. at 537 n.14 
 111. 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (2006). 
 112. 29 U.S.C. § 655 (2006). 
 113. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a) (2006). 
 114. Getting Away with Murder, supra note 109, at 539. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 540. 
 117. 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (2006). 
 118. 29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(4) (2006). 
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In light of the savings clause and Congresss broad remedial 
purpose, federal courts have generally found that tort claims 
arising out of workplace injuries are not preempted.119 One court, 
in allowing tort claims by workers injured by welding fumes, 
observed that no other enactment contains a savings clause 
more broad, plainly evidencing Congresss intent to leave 
common law liabilities absolutely unchanged.120 The Supreme 
Court has not had occasion to issue a ruling on the matter, but it 
has noted that, due to the statutory savings clause, compliance 
with OSHA standards is no defense to state tort or criminal 
liabilities.121 
C. Products Liability 
1. Medical Devices, Drugs, and Practices. State common 
law remedies for harms caused by drugs and medical devices 
have been the subject of some of the fiercest preemption battles 
before the Supreme Court.122 Savings clauses have played a role 
in nearly every dispute. In one case, the absence of a savings 
clause left the Supreme Court free to deny a remedy for wrongful 
                                                          
 119. See, e.g., Lindsey v. Caterpillar, Inc., 480 F.3d 202, 207, 211 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(finding that OSHAs focus on the health and safety of workers does not preempt state law 
tort claims asserted on behalf of deceased workers); Pedraza v. Shell Oil Co., 942 F.2d 48, 
5053 (1st Cir. 1991) (noting that while OSHA does not create private rights of action, 
neither does it preempt private tort actions), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1082 (1991); Natl 
Solid Wastes Mgmt. Assn. v. Killian, 918 F.2d 671, 677, 684 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that 
while state laws regulating workplace health and safety are preempted by OSHA, state 
laws regulating public health and safety would not necessarily be preempted); Pratico v. 
Portland Terminal Co., 783 F.2d 255, 26667 (1st Cir. 1985) (allowing violations of OSHA 
to be considered as evidence of negligence per se); In re Welding Fume Prods. Liab. Litig., 
364 F. Supp. 2d 669, 685 (N.D. Ohio 2005) (finding that state failure to warn claims are 
not preempted by OSHA); Barrientos v. UTBattelle, LLC, 284 F. Supp. 2d 908, 91516 
(S.D. Ohio 2003) (relying on OSHAs savings clause to find no preemption of state tort 
claims); see also Sakellaridis v. Polar Air Cargo, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 160, 164 (E.D.N.Y. 
2000) (The savings clause plainly states that workers statutory remedies for personal 
injuries are preserved regardless of whether the duty of care stems from common law, a 
separate statutory scheme, or an administrative scheme). But see ConocoPhillips Co. v. 
Henry, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 1330, 1340 (N.D. Okla. 2007) (holding that OSHAs 
requirement that employers provide workplaces free of serious hazards implicitly 
preempted a state statute barring property owners from prohibiting storage of firearms in 
vehicles located on the premises because the presence of weapons could obstruct the 
employers duty to protect employees). 
 120. Welding Fume Prods. Liab. Litig., 364 F. Supp. 2d at 68788. 
 121. Intl Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of America, 
UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 214 (1991). For the Courts treatment of 
state regulation of the workplace, see infra Part IV.B. 
 122. See Robert Barnes, Supreme Court Shields Medical-Device Makers, WASH. POST, 
Feb. 21, 2008, at D1 (reporting on reactions to the Supreme Courts decision in Medtronic, 
Inc. v. Lohr). See generally Sharkey, supra note 23 (examining preemption in the context 
of products liability). 
(8)ZELLMER 2/22/2009  1:15 PM 
2009] PREEMPTION BY STEALTH 1685 
death caused by one of the most addictive and dangerous drugs 
on the market: cigarettes.123 
Tobacco use, according to the Court, poses perhaps the 
single most significant threat to public health in the United 
States.124 Rather than seeking the assistance of federal agencies 
and states to protect consumers, however, since the nations 
founding, Congress has jealously guarded congressional oversight 
and protection of commerce in tobacco.125 In Cipollone v. Liggett 
Group, Inc., the Court took note of the near-exclusive 
congressional prerogative over tobacco products in its decision to 
shield tobacco companies from failure-to-warn claims brought by 
injured smokers and their families.126 
Cipollone, whose mother died of lung cancer, alleged that the 
tobacco companies failed to provide adequate warnings about the 
risks of smoking, expressly warranted that their products were 
safe for consumer use, and conspired to conceal medical evidence 
about smoking risks. The companies defense turned on the 
Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act, which was intended both 
to warn the public of the hazards of smoking and to protect the 
economic interests of tobacco companies by imposing uniform 
cigarette labeling and advertising requirements.127 
The Act provided that, other than statements or labeling 
required by the Act, [n]o requirement or prohibition based on 
smoking and health shall be imposed under State law with 
respect to the advertising or promotion of any cigarettes.128 The 
Court of Appeals found that tort claims related to warnings or 
advertisements were not expressly preempted but rather were 
impliedly preempted because they would conflict with federal 
objectives by upsetting Congresss carefully drawn balance 
between the purposes of warning the public of the hazards of 
                                                          
 123. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 50810, 522 (1992). Although the 
Court determined that tobacco products are not a drug regulated by the FDA under 
federal law, see FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 13133 (2000), 
the common meaning of the termA chemical substance, such as a narcotic, that affects 
the central nervous system, causing changes in behavior and often addiction, AMERICAN 
HERITAGE DICTIONARY 431 (4th College ed. 2002)certainly reaches cigarettes. 
 124. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 570 (2001) (quoting Brown & 
Williamson Tobacco, 529 U.S. at 161). 
 125. See Brown & Williamson Tobacco, 529 U.S. at 15960 (Owing to its unique 
place in American history and society . . . Congress, for better or for worse, has created a 
distinct regulatory scheme for tobacco products . . . .). Congress has repeatedly acted to 
preclude any agency from exercising significant policymaking authority over tobacco 
products, including the FDA. Id. at 160. 
 126. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 51620. 
 127. Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, § 2, 84 Stat. 
87, 87 (1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006)). 
 128. 15 U.S.C. § 1334 (2006). 
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cigarette smoking and protecting the interests of national 
economy.129 The Rehnquist Court affirmed, but on express 
preemption grounds, construing the phrase requirement or 
prohibition as easily encompassing tort actions because 
regulation can be as effectively exerted through an award of 
damages as through some form of preventive relief.130 
The Courts conclusion that the Act expressly preempted all 
claims related to omissions or inclusions in cigarette advertising 
represents a marked departure from Silkwood.131 A key 
distinction was that, unlike the AEA and most other federal 
health and welfare statutes, tobacco has been a predominantly 
federal, rather than state, concern. Accordingly, the Cigarette 
Smoking Act included no savings clause. Absent a savings clause, 
it was easier for the Cipollone Court to infer that Congress was 
indifferent about leaving injured plaintiffs with no remedy. 
Although a few courts recognized this distinction, a trend quickly 
emerged in the lower courts to construe Cipollone as requiring an 
expansive reading of preemption clauses, regardless of the 
presence of a savings clause in the statute under consideration.132 
Just a few years after Cipollone, the Rehnquist Court 
assumed a more nuanced approach in a preemption case 
involving the Medical Device Act (MDA), a statute with both a 
savings clause and a preemption clause.133 Prior to its enactment 
in 1976, the regulation of new medical devices was left largely to 
the states.134 However, as complex devices proliferated and some, 
like the Dalkon Shield, failed and caused widespread harm, 
Congress deemed it appropriate to require uniform premarket 
approval processes.135 
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr involved negligence and strict 
liability claims against the manufacturer of a pacemaker that 
                                                          
 129. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181, 187 (3d Cir. 1986); cf. Brown & 
Williamson Tobacco, 529 U.S. at 15961 (holding that the Food and Drug Administration 
lacks authority to regulate tobacco products and that Congresss express policy of 
protecting commerce in tobacco to the maximum extent reveals its intent that tobacco 
products remain on the market). 
 130. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 521. 
 131. See Richard C. Ausness, Preemption of State Tort Law by Federal Safety 
Statutes: Supreme Court Preemption Jurisprudence Since Cipollone, 92 KY. L.J. 913, 939 
(2004) (examining the Courts shift from Silkwood to Cipollone); supra notes 10107 and 
accompanying text (discussing Silkwood). 
 132. Betsy J. Grey, Make Congress Speak Clearly: Federal Preemption of State Tort 
Remedies, 77 B.U. L. REV. 559, 582 (1997); infra note 232 and accompanying text. 
 133. 21 U.S.C. §§ 360h(d), 360k(a) (2006). 
 134. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 1002 (2008). 
 135. Id. at 100304. 
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failed.136 Like the Cigarette Smoking Act, the Medical Device Act 
specifies that no State . . . may establish . . . any requirement 
which is different from, or in addition to, any 
requirement . . . which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the 
device.137 The Court reasoned that the word requirement, as 
used in the Medical Device Act, entailed the imposition of a 
specific, positive duty on the manufacturer and therefore did not 
preempt common law claims.138 It acknowledged that Cipollone 
held that the Cigarette Smoking Acts preemption of state 
requirements included tort claims, but found that Act 
distinguishable because it preempted only a limited set of 
claimsthose related to advertising or promotion.139 In contrast, 
according to the Court, a sweeping interpretation of the phrase 
any requirement as used in the Medical Device Act would 
require far greater interference with state legal remedies, 
producing a serious intrusion into state sovereignty while 
simultaneously wiping out the possibility of remedy 
for . . . injuries.140 
The Medical Device Act is distinct from the Cigarette 
Smoking Act in another important way. It includes a savings 
clause for liabilities related to devices recalled for posing 
unreasonable risks of harm.141 Although this clause was not 
strictly applicable to the pacemaker at issue in Lohr, the Court of 
Appeals viewed it as evidence of congressional intent to preserve 
common law remedies.142 The Supreme Court agreed that, To the 
extent that Congress was concerned about protecting the 
industry . . . any such concern was far outweighed by concerns 
about the primary issue motivating . . . enactment: the safety of 
those who use medical devices.143 Yet it completely ignored the 
savings clause, which would have lent support to this conclusion. 
Because the Lohr pacemaker had not been subject to a 
specific Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulationit 
evaded the approval process by being substantially equivalent 
                                                          
 136. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 48081 (1996). Plaintiffs brought both a 
negligence count, alleging a breach of duty to use reasonable care in the design, 
manufacture, assembly, and sale of the device and a failure to warn the plaintiff or her 
physicians of the pacemakers tendency to fail, and a strict liability count, alleging that 
the pacemaker was in a defective condition and unreasonably dangerous to foreseeable 
users at the time of its sale. Id. at 481 (citations omitted). 
 137. 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 138. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 48789. 
 139. Id. at 488. 
 140. Id. at 48889. 
 141. 21 U.S.C. § 360h(d) (2006). 
 142. Lohr v. Medtronic, Inc., 56 F.3d 1335, 1342 (11th Cir. 1995). 
 143. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 49091. 
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to a previously permitted device144some lower courts 
distinguished the Supreme Courts opinion and found preemption 
in cases involving devices that had received direct approval.145 
The Court itself noted that the outcome in Lohr would have been 
less certain if the FDA had given specific approval of the 
pacemakers design.146 Conversely, other courts have concluded 
that premarket approval did not impose federal requirements 
because the manufacturer, not the FDA, selected the design, 
manufacturing, and labeling specifications. So long as the 
statutory standards are met, the FDA must approve the 
device.147 In other words, the FDA is not authorized to 
determine whether the devices design or performance is 
optimal, or whether it is safer than devices already on the 
market.148 FDA requirements therefore create a floor, not a 
ceiling, for state regulation.149 Moreover, a liability finding would 
not require the manufacturer to redesign its product but only to 
pay a judgment in favor of the injured party. While the 
manufacturer might choose to take measures to avoid recurring 
problems, it might instead do nothing, particularly if it believes 
that the adverse ruling is simply an aberration or that the 
likelihood of recurrence is too remote to justify any change in the 
[device].150 
                                                          
 144. Id. at 493. 
 145. See, e.g., Horn v. Thoratec Corp., 376 F.3d 163, 167, 176, 17980 (3d Cir. 2004) 
(holding that the FDAs issuance of HeartMates premarket approval imposed 
requirements on the manufacturer, and that tort claims would impose substantive 
requirements on [the manufacturer] that would conflict with, or add to, the requirements 
imposed by the FDA involved in the design, manufacturing, fabrication and labeling of 
the device); Brooks v. Howmedica, Inc., 273 F.3d 785, 795 (8th Cir. 2001) (distinguishing 
between the premarket approval in Lohr and the close FDA scrutiny applied to the device 
in question); Martin v. Medtronic, Inc., 254 F.3d 573, 584 (5th Cir. 2001) (interpreting 
Lohr). 
 146. See Lohr, 518 U.S. at 498 (citing an FDA regulation that provided that state 
requirements are preempted only when the FDA has established specific counterpart 
regulations or . . . other specific requirements applicable to a particular device. 21 C.F.R. 
§ 808.1(d) (1995)). 
 147. David C. Vladeck, Preemption and Regulatory Failure Risks, in PREEMPTION 
CHOICE: THE THEORY, LAW, AND REALITY OF FEDERALISMS CORE QUESTION, supra note 
37, at 54, 62; see also In re Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Prods. Liab. Litig., 
No. 06-25, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42765, at *19 n.6 (D. Minn. June 12, 2007) (noting that 
FDA approval of medical devices cannot necessarily be used as a complete liability shield); 
In re Medtronic, Inc., Implantable Defibrillators Litig., 465 F. Supp. 2d 886, 89496 (D. 
Minn. 2006) (noting that state law tort claims may provide parallel restrictions on 
medical devices, rather than additional restrictions). For details on the premarket 
approval process, see 21 U.S.C. § 360e(d) (2006). 
 148. Vladeck, supra note 147, at 6162. 
 149. Levine v. Wyeth, 944 A.2d 179, 184 (Vt. 2006), cert. granted, 128 S. Ct. 1118 
(2008). 
 150. Vladeck, supra note 147, at 62; see also Levine, 944 A.2d at 18889 (holding that 
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The MDA is a licensing statute designed to promote the 
manufacture and marketing of medical devices by balancing the 
desire for effective, widely available devices with the need for 
patients safety;151 thus, the latter line of cases seems more in line 
with congressional intent to preserve both common law remedies 
for victims of unsafe devices and the states abilities to provide 
recourse in specific cases where the devices are not effective or 
safe.152 In 2008, however, the Roberts Court reviewed another 
medical device case, Riegel, and concluded in an 81 decision that 
tort claims relating to the failure of a catheter specifically 
approved by the FDA are indeed preempted as imposing 
additional requirements on manufacturers.153 Writing for the 
Court, Justice Scalia found that allowing state juries to impose 
liability on the manufacturer of an approved device disrupts the 
federal scheme, which grants the FDA authority to evaluate the 
risks and benefits of a new device through its premarket 
approval processes.154 The device in question, a balloon catheter 
that burst during its use in an angioplasty, had received 
premarket approval from the FDA.155 This distinguished the 
catheter from the pacemaker at issue in Lohr, which had been 
grandfathered as an equivalent device that preexisted the 
statutory requirements and was therefore subject to generic 
concerns about device regulation generally.156 For the Lohr 
pacemaker, the FDA had determined only that the device was 
equivalent to an approved device, not that it was necessarily 
safe.157 The Court drew a sharp distinction between equivalency 
review and premarket approval, noting that the FDA is 
authorized to provide premarket approval only when the device 
offers a reasonable assurance of safety, and once approval is 
                                                          
prescription drug labeling judgments imposed on manufacturers by the FDA do not 
preempt state law product liability claims, as the labels compliance with FDA 
requirements did not establish the adequacy of the warning or prevent the manufacturer 
from strengthening the warning to prevent harm to consumers). 
 151. See 21 U.S.C. § 360h (2006) (limiting FDA recall authority to devices that 
present an unreasonable risk of substantial harm to the public health). 
 152. See Vladeck, supra note 56, at 127 ([T]he MDA is not designed to optimize 
public health. It is a licensing statute that trades off public health imperatives for the 
benefit of medical device manufacturers.); id. at 130 (arguing that the MDA, FIFRA, the 
Motor Vehicle Safety Act, and the Boat Safety Act all embody trade-offs between public 
health concerns and the need to ensure a competitive marketplace that rewards 
innovation and quality. None of [the] statutes . . . imposes a discipline on the marketplace 
sufficient to ensure a reasonable margin of safety . . . .). 
 153. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 1005, 1008 (2008). 
 154. Id. at 1008. 
 155. Id. at 100405 (discussing 21 U.S.C. § 360e(d) (2006)). 
 156. Id. at 100607 (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 501 (1996)). 
 157. Id. at 1007. 
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given, the device must be manufactured with virtually no 
deviations from the specifications in its approval application, for 
the reason that the FDA has determined that the approved form 
provides a reasonable assurance of safety and effectiveness.158 
This distinction, along with the statutory requirements for 
postapproval disclosure by industry coupled with the FDAs duty 
to withdraw approval for devices that turn out to be unsafe or 
ineffective,159 convinced the Court that premarket regulatory 
approvals constituted requirements that therefore preempted 
any duties imposed by state common law.160 
This holding, standing alone, has relatively limited impact 
on potential tort claims aimed at harmful devices because the 
rigorous regime of premarket approval is required only for a 
limited number of new Class III devices.161 Only thirty-two Class 
III devices required premarket approval in 2005, while 3,148 
Class III devices were approved as substantial equivalents, like 
the Lohr pacemaker.162 By comparison, Class I and Class II 
devices, such as bandages, surgical gloves, and wheelchairs, are 
subject to far less rigorous controls.163 
Arguably, if the Court had stopped there, the case would be 
rather unremarkable. The remainder of the opinion, however, 
poses far-reaching concerns for all tort claims related to federally 
regulated products. First, in a departure from Lohr, the Court 
construed the term requirements, as used in the MDA and 
many other statutory preemption provisions, to include common 
law liabilities.164 It relied heavily on Cipollone in reaching this 
conclusion: 
Absent other indication, reference to a States 
requirements includes its common-law duties. As the 
                                                          
 158. Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. § 360e(d) (2006)). 
 159. Id. at 1005 (citing 21 U.S.C. §§ 360(i) (2006)) (requiring manufacturers to report 
any changes or problems with the product to the FDA); see also 21 U.S.C. § 360e(e)(1) 
(2006) (noting the FDAs duty to withdraw approval for devices that are later proven to be 
unsafe or ineffective); 21 U.S.C. § 360h(e) (2006) (granting the FDA the authority to recall 
devices on the market that are shown to be unsafe or ineffective). 
 160. Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 100708 (addressing 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2006)). 
 161. Id. at 100304. Premarket approval is required only for devices that have no 
substantial equivalent already on the market, id. at 1004, and that are for a use in 
supporting or sustaining human life or for a use which is of substantial importance in 
preventing impairment of human health, or present[ ] a potential unreasonable risk of 
illness or injury, where a less stringent classification cannot provide reasonable 
assurances of safety and effectiveness. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(C)(ii) (2006). 
 162. Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1004. 
 163. Id. at 1003. 
 164. Id. at 1008; see also supra notes 13640 and accompanying text (discussing 
Lohrs construction of the term requirements). 
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plurality opinion said in Cipollone, common-law liability is 
premised on the existence of a legal duty, and a tort 
judgment therefore establishes that the defendant has 
violated a state-law obligation. . . . [A] liability award can 
be, indeed is designed to be, a potent method of governing 
conduct and controlling policy.165 
Although the Court left open the possibility for some other 
indication to negate its sweeping interpretation of the term 
requirements, it firmly rejected arguments that Congress had 
provided any such indication in the MDA.166 Instead, it recited 
numerous concerns with jury verdicts that make it seem unlikely 
that common law tort claims could survive any statutory 
preemption clause that uses the term requirements: 
State tort law that requires a manufacturers catheters to 
be safer, but hence less effective, than the model the FDA 
has approved disrupts the federal scheme no less than state 
regulatory law to the same effect. Indeed, one would think 
that tort law, applied by juries under a negligence or strict 
liability standard, is less deserving of preservation. A state 
statute, or a regulation adopted by a state agency, could at 
least be expected to apply costbenefit analysis similar to 
that applied by the experts at the FDA: How many more 
lives will be saved by a device which, along with its greater 
effectiveness, brings a greater risk of harm? A jury, on the 
other hand, sees only the cost of a more dangerous design, 
and is not concerned with its benefits; the patients who 
reaped those benefits are not represented in court. 
  . . . [T]he solicitude for those injured by FDA-approved 
devices . . . was overcome in Congresss estimation by 
solicitude for those who would suffer without new medical 
devices if juries were allowed to apply the tort law of 50 
States to all innovations.167 
The irony of the Courts conclusions regarding the disruptive 
nature of jury verdicts was not missed by Justice Ginsburg, who 
stated in dissent, The Courts construction . . . has the perverse 
effect of granting broad immunity to an entire industry that, in 
the judgment of Congress, needed more stringent 
regulation . . . not exemption from liability in tort litigation.168 
                                                          
 165. Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1008 (citing Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 505 U.S. 504, 521
22 (1992)). The Court also cited Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431 (2005), 
described at infra notes 23338 and accompanying text, in support of its reading of the 
term requirements. 
 166. Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1008. 
 167. Id. at 100809 (emphasis added). 
 168. Id. at 1016 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 
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She noted a complete lack of evidence that, in passing the MDA, 
Congress believed state tort remedies impeded the development 
of medical devices.169 If anything, Congress was aware that tort 
liability for injuries caused by defectively designed or labeled 
medical devices was a domain historically occupied by state law 
that ought not be displaced by federal legislation,170 and intended 
the MDA only to preempt a hodgepodge of state regulatory 
systems of premarket approval.171 Moreover, the lack of any 
provision for a federal compensatory remedy in the MDA 
provides further evidence that Congress did not intend broadly 
to preempt state common-law suits.172 As for the Courts strained 
interpretation of the ambiguous term requirements, Justice 
Ginsburg pointed out that [i]n the absence of legislative 
precision . . . courts ordinarily accept the reading that disfavors 
preemption.173 
Both practical and equitable considerations support Justice 
Ginsburgs position. As noted above, the manufacturer, not the 
FDA, selects the devices design as well as its manufacturing and 
labeling features.174 The FDA is not charged with deciding 
whether the devices design is optimal or even whether the device 
is safer or more effective than other existing devices.175 So long as 
the statutory standards are met, the FDA must approve the 
device.176 By awarding monetary damages in individual cases, 
juries, on the other hand, can respond to specific instances where 
a particular device was not safe and ends up harming the very 
person it was supposed to benefit: the patient. 
As for the MDAs savings clauses, the Court gave only a 
passing, footnoted reference to them. Section 360k(b), which 
authorizes the FDA to exempt state requirements from 
preemption when states seek an exemption for more stringent 
                                                          
470, 487 (1996)) (emphasis added); see also id. at 1014 (Congress enacted the MDA to 
provide for the safety and effectiveness of medical devices intended for human use in the 
wake of [a] series of high profile medical device failures that caused extensive injuries 
and loss of life . . . . (quoting Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295, 
preamble, 90 Stat. 539, 539 (1976))). 
 169. Id. at 1012 (majority opinion). 
 170. Id. at 1013 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 171. Id. at 1013. California, for example, adopted a system of premarket approval for 
medical devices prior to 1976, when the federal government first engaged in premarket 
regulation. Id. 
 172. Id. at 1015 (citing Silkwood v. KerrMcGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 251 (1984)). 
 173. Id. at 1014 (quoting Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005)). 
 174. See supra notes 14749 and accompanying text. 
 175. Brief for Senator Edward Kennedy and Representative Henry A. Waxman as 
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 1819, Riegel, 128 S. Ct. 999 (No. 06-179). 
 176. Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1004 (majority opinion) (citing 21 U.S.C. § 360e(d) (2006)). 
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requirements or when state requirements are necessitated by 
compelling local conditions, was construed as barely relevant in 
the statutory scheme because, according to the Court, it specifies 
circumstances that would rarely be met for common-law 
duties.177 Section 360h(d), which provides that compliance with 
certain FDA orders shall not relieve any person from liability 
under Federal or State law,178 fared no better. The Court agreed 
that this provision means that some state-law claims, such as 
those raised in Lohr, are not preempted, but went on to state 
that Section 360h(d) could not possibly mean that all state-law 
claims are not pre-empted, since that would deprive the MDA 
pre-emption clause of all content. And it provides no guidance as 
to which state-law claims are pre-empted and which are not.179 
In effect, the Courts interpretation eviscerated both savings 
clauses by allowing the preemption provision to trump them, at 
least as applied to medical devices. This resulted despite the 
presumption against preemption, which should have been 
applied in Riegel to clear up any ambiguities in favor of common 
law remedies.180 
The FDA itself has taken contradictory positions on 
preemption over the years. In its amicus brief, it argued that 
Riegels claim was preempted,181 citing a regulatory provision that 
specifies that the MDA sets forth a general rule pre-empting 
state duties having the force and effect of law (whether 
established by statute, ordinance, regulation, or court 
decision).182 A separate subsection of the same regulation, 
however, provides that [s]tate or local requirements of general 
applicability . . . [applicable to other products] in addition to 
[medical] devices, such as provisions related to unfair trade 
practices or fire codes, are not preempted.183 Adding to the 
confusion, in previous FDA briefs, advisory opinions, and a 
published statement regarding the Lohr decision, the FDA 
expressed its belief that FDA product approval and state tort 
                                                          
 177. Id. at 1008 n.4. 
 178. 21 U.S.C. § 360h(d) (2006). 
 179. Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1008 n.4. 
 180. See id. at 1016 n.9 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ([T]he perceived lack of guidance 
[in Section 360h(d)] should cut against Medtronic, not in its favor.). 
 181. Id. at 1016 n.8 (citing Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 1624, Riegel, 
128 S. Ct. 999 (No. 06-179)). 
 182. Id. at 1010 (majority opinion) (citing Exemptions from Federal Preemption of 
State and Local Medical Device Requirements, 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(b) (1993)). 
 183. 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d)(1) (1993). The Court found that this subsection, which was 
discussed in the Lohr case, see supra note 146, was limited to those requirements that 
relate only incidentally to medical devices, not general tort duties of care. Riegel, 128 S. 
Ct. at 1010. 
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liability usually operate independently, each providing a 
significant, yet distinct, layer of consumer protection.184 In 
Riegel, the Roberts Court concluded that it need not rely on the 
agencys interpretation of the MDAs preemption and savings 
clauses, however, because it found the statutory language 
unambiguous.185 
In the end, the Court conceded only that states could 
continue to provide common law remedies for parallel state law 
claims premised on a violation of FDA regulations.186 However, 
this concession provides little solace for patients like Mr. Riegel 
who are injured by devices that are approved by the FDA but 
nonetheless prove unsafe.187 While the FDA may order a 
manufacturer to repair, replace, refund, or even recall a 
dangerous device, such action may not occur until after patients 
are injured.188 Congress was surely aware that the FDAs power 
to order some recourse would be insufficient to make injured 
patients whole, as demonstrated by the inclusion of 
Section 360h(d): Compliance with an order issued under this 
section shall not relieve any person from liability under Federal 
or State law.189 
It is telling that the medical community itself acknowledges 
that FDA approval is not a guarantee of . . . safety,190 because 
                                                          
 184. Id. at 1015 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Margaret Jane Porter, The Lohr 
Decision: FDA Perspective and Position, 52 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 7, 11 (1997)). The dissent 
quoted further from the passage published by the former chief counsel to the FDA in 
1997: 
FDA regulation of a device cannot anticipate and protect against all safety risks 
to individual consumers. . . . Regulation cannot protect against all possible 
injuries that might result from use of a device over time. Preemption of all such 
claims would result in the loss of a significant layer of consumer protection. 
Id. 
 185. Id. at 1009 (majority opinion). For an in-depth assessment of the effect of agency 
positions on preemption, see Sharkey, supra note 7, which examines the way in which 
agencies attempt to influence state regulations and common law through the use of 
preambles; and William Funk, Preemption by Federal Agency Action, in PREEMPTION 
CHOICE: THE THEORY, LAW, AND REALITY OF FEDERALISMS CORE QUESTION, supra note 
37, at 214. Professor Funk observes that federal agencies are increasingly attempting to 
dictate preemption of state tort remedies not only through their regulations but also 
through preambles to regulations and amicus briefs, and notes that the FDA in particular 
has received the most press for leading the charge in this effort. Id. at 214, 226. 
 186. Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1011. 
 187. Id. at 1015 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 188. Id. at 1016 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 360h(b)(2), (e) (2006)). 
 189. 21 U.S.C. § 360h(d) (2006) (emphasis added). Section 360h(d) anticipates 
[court-awarded] damages for economic loss from which the value of any FDA-ordered 
remedy would be subtracted. Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1016 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 360h(d) 
(2006)). 
 190. Gregory D. Curfman, M.D., Stephen Morrissey, Ph.D. & Jeffrey M. Drazen, 
M.D., Why Doctors Should Worry about Preemption, 359 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1, 2 (2008). 
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the FDA knows only what manufacturers reveal.191 Both the 
public and the FDA can learn significant details about the effects 
on patients through the process of pretrial discovery and trial 
itself, where previously unknown or undisclosed information 
about toxicity or defects may come to light. [P]roduct-liability 
litigation has unquestionably helped to remove unsafe products 
from the market and to prevent others from entering it.192 Prior 
to the George W. Bush Administration, members of both the 
executive and legislative branches apparently considered tort 
litigation to be a vital part of the regulatory framework for drugs 
and medical devices. The FDA itself believed that litigation by 
consumers . . . complement[ed] the FDAs regulatory actions and 
enhance[d] patient safety.193 For their part, congressional 
members, including several who were involved in the passage of 
the MDA, have introduced legislation to overturn Riegel by 
explicitly limiting the scope of MDA preemption.194 
Finally, although manufacturers of medical devices applaud 
the Riegel decision, manufacturers would not be unduly 
burdened by having to comply with both premarket approval 
requirements imposed by the FDA and the need to answer to 
state common law claims in the event that a patient is injured by 
its device. Indeed, a manufacturers proof of compliance with 
FDA requirements could be used as evidence that it used due 
care in the design and labeling of the product, which would help 
it in defending against a negligence claim.195 
The Roberts Courts treatment of tort claims by patients 
injured by FDA-approved products will soon be tested again in a 
Vermont case, Levine v. Wyeth.196 Unlike the MDA, however, the 
statutory regime for the product at issue in Levinea drug 
known as Phenerganis silent regarding preemption.197 The drug 
manufacturer has raised implied conflict preemption arguments 
                                                          
 191. Id. Unlike other agencies, the FDA has no subpoena power. Thus, serious 
safety issues often come to light only after a drug [or device] has entered the market. Id. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. at 1; see also supra note 184 and accompanying text (discussing viewpoints 
of the FDAs former General Council). 
 194. Barnaby J. Feder, Medical Device Ruling Redraws Lines on Lawsuits, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 22, 2008, at C2. 
 195. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 1020 (2008). 
 196. Levine v. Wyeth, 944 A.2d 179 (Vt. 2006), cert. granted, 128 S. Ct. 1118 (2008). 
 197. Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act (FDCA), 21 U.S.C. §§ 301399 (2006). Although 
the statute itself is silent, in 2006 the FDA asserted that the FDCA preempts state tort 
claims in its preamble to a new labeling regulation. See Sharkey, supra note 7, at 241 
(citing Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug 
and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3934 (Jan. 24, 2006) (to be codified at 21 
C.F.R. pts. 201, 314, 601)). 
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to shield itself from negligent failure-to-warn claims by a patient 
who lost her arm to gangrene after Phenergan was 
administered.198 The Vermont Supreme Court cited a long line of 
federal and state court cases holding that FDA approval of a drug 
does not preempt state tort claims,199 and explicitly distinguished 
the preemption provision of the MDA from the statutory 
provisions related to drugs.200 It rejected the manufacturers 
arguments and upheld the $7 million verdict for the plaintiff.201 
By accepting certiorari in the Levine case, the Roberts Court 
has demonstrated its keen interest in preemption battles.202 The 
Court has an opportunity to set the record straight by soundly 
rejecting preemption arguments for drug related tort claims,203 
and by casting Riegel in the narrow light it deserves, as a case 
governing only the limited group of Class III devices that receive 
the most rigorous FDA scrutiny available under federal law. 
2. Vehicles. State law claims arising from injuries caused by 
vehicles sold in interstate commerce have provoked vigorous 
preemption challenges by manufacturers and trade associations. The 
results in three opinions issued by the Rehnquist Court are mixed. 
In a 1995 case, Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, the Rehnquist 
Court considered a design defect claim against manufacturers 
                                                          
 198. Levine, 944 A.2d at 184 (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 505 U.S. 504, 516 
(1992)). The drug was injected into her arm to alleviate nausea resulting from a migraine 
headache. Id. at 182. 
 199. Id. at 186. 
 200. Id. at 187 (citing Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 348 
(2001) (holding that fraud-on-the-FDA claims were preempted by the MDA in a case 
involving a medical device). 
 201. Id. at 18283. 
 202. See Erwin Chemerinsky, A Troubling Trend in Preemption Rulings, TRIAL, May 
2008, at 62 (noting a troubling trend in preemption cases issued thus far by the Roberts 
Court, indicating that the Court is very willing to let federal law trump state law when 
business interests are at stake); see also Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 1008 
(2008) (holding that state common law duties constituted requirements and were thus 
preempted by the MDA); Rowe v. N.H. Motor Transp. Assn, 128 S. Ct. 989, 993 (2008) 
(preempting state requirements for shippers to ensure against delivery of cigarettes to 
minors); Preston v. Ferrer, 128 S. Ct. 978, 981 (2008) (holding that, when parties agree to 
arbitrate all questions arising under contract, the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) 
preempts state laws lodging primary jurisdiction in any other forum). 
 203. David C. Vladeck, The FDA and Deference Lost: A Self-Inflicted Wound or the 
Product of a Wounded Agency? A Response to Professor OReilly, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 981, 
99394 (2008). The Court was unable to resolve this issue in another recent drug-related 
case, Desiano v. WarnerLambert & Co., 467 F.3d 85, 87 (2d Cir. 2006), where the 
appellate courts decision that federal law did not preempt state tort claims was affirmed 
per curiam by an equally divided Court. WarnerLambert Co., LLC v. Kent, 128 S. Ct. 
1168, 1168 (2008). Chief Justice Roberts recused himself from the case because he owned 
shares in Pfizer, Inc., the parent company of WarnerLambert. Id. 
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who failed to equip trucks with antilock braking systems.204 
Plaintiffs were seriously injured when semi trucks struck their 
vehicles. The Motor Vehicle Safety Act contained an express 
preemption clause prohibiting states from enacting vehicle safety 
standards that were not identical to applicable federal 
standards.205 The Act also included a savings clause providing 
that compliance with a federal vehicle safety standard does not 
exempt a person from any liability at common law.206 
Distinguishing Cipollone, which it had handed down just a few 
years earlier, the Court concluded that the existence of a limited 
preemption clause in the Act indicated Congress did not intend to 
preempt other matters.207 Interestingly, as in Lohr, the Court 
paid no attention to the Acts savings clause.208 
In 2000, the Rehnquist Court returned to the Motor Vehicle 
Safety Act in Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., where it took 
note of the statutory savings clause but preempted a products 
liability claim nonetheless.209 Ms. Geier, who was seriously 
injured when she struck a tree while driving her 1987 Honda 
Accord, claimed that Hondas failure to install an airbag 
constituted a design defect. Honda argued that it had complied 
with a Department of Transportation standard requiring passive 
restraints in some but not all vehicles by installing airbags in a 
percentage of its 1987 models.210 
The Court observed that the Acts preemption provision, 
barring states from establishing any nonidentical safety 
standard, could be construed broadly to include common law 
actions but that the existence of the savings clause required a 
more narrow interpretation.211 When it came to implied 
                                                          
 204. Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 282 (1995). 
 205. Id. at 284 (When a motor vehicle safety standard is in effect under this chapter, 
a State . . . may prescribe or continue in effect a standard applicable to the same aspect of 
performance of a motor vehicle . . . only if the standard is identical to the standard 
prescribed under this chapter. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1392(d) (subsequently moved to 49 
U.S.C. § 30103(b)(1) (2000)))). 
 206. 49 U.S.C. § 30103(e) (2000) (previously 15 U.S.C. § 1397(k)). 
 207. Freightliner Corp., 514 U.S. at 28788. 
 208. Id. at 287 n.3 (Because no federal safety standard exists . . . . [we] also need not 
address respondents claim that the savings clause . . . does not [permit] a manufacturer 
to use a federal safety standard to immunize itself . . . .). Much like Lohr, where no 
specific premarket approval had been required for the device at issue, the Court noted 
that no specific federal safety standard had been issued for antilock brakes. Id. at 286. 
 209. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861, 865 (2000). 
 210. Id. at 86465. In Riegel, by comparison, preapproval requirements for a balloon 
catheter were held to preempt liabilities imposed by state tort law under the MDA. See 
supra Part III.C.1 (analyzing the Riegel decision and its potential consequences). 
 211. See Geier, 529 U.S. at 869 (questioning whether the savings clause does more 
than just remove[ ] tort actions from the scope of the express pre-emption clause by 
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preemption, however, the Courts approach turned the 
presumption against preemption of traditional state police 
powers on its head. It found that, read together, the savings and 
preemption provisions reflected a neutral policy toward conflict 
preemption.212 Foreshadowing Riegel, the Court concluded that 
giving the savings clause broad effect would upset the careful 
regulatory scheme established by federal law for vehicle safety 
standards.213 Because the preemption and savings clauses 
neutralized each other, the Court felt free to look outside the 
statutory text and to place some weight on the Departments 
conclusion, expressed in the governments litigation brief, that 
tort actions would pose an obstacle to the accomplishment of 
federal regulatory objectives.214 
Just two years later, another wrinkle was added to the 
Rehnquist Courts savings clause jurisprudence in Sprietsma v. 
Mercury Marine, where a passenger struck by a boats propeller 
brought a design defect claim against the engine designer.215 The 
Court issued a unanimous opinion that relied heavily on the 
language of the Boat Safety Acts savings clause in finding that 
the claim survived express preemption.216 Unlike Geier, it also 
took note of the clause in finding that the claim also survived 
implied preemption.217 
The Boat Safety Act authorized the Coast Guard to establish 
minimum safety standards and prohibited states from enforcing 
a law or regulation establishing a . . . safety standard . . . not 
identical to a regulation promulgated under the Act.218 The Acts 
savings clause stated, Compliance with this chapter or 
standards, regulations, or orders . . . does not relieve a person 
from liability at common law.219 Contravening both Geier and 
Cipollone, the Court concluded that the phrase a law or 
regulation, as used in the Acts preemption clause, referred only 
                                                          
foreclosing or limiting the operation of ordinary pre-emption principles insofar as those 
principles instruct us to read statutes as pre-empting state laws . . . that actually conflict 
with the statute or federal standards promulgated thereunder and answering no). 
 212. Id. at 87071. 
 213. Id. at 870 (quoting United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 10607 (2000). Riegel is 
discussed at supra Part III.C.1. 
 214. Id. at 883; see also Alexander K. Haas, Chipping Away at State Tort Remedies 
Through Pre-Emption Jurisprudence: Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 89 CAL. L. 
REV. 1927, 193031 (2001) (commenting on the Courts justifications for preempting 
Geiers tort claims). 
 215. Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 5455 (2002). 
 216. Id. at 53, 64. 
 217. Id. at 6970. 
 218. 46 U.S.C. § 4306 (2000). 
 219. 46 U.S.C. § 4311(g) (2000). 
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to positive enactments and not to common law torts.220 Parsing 
the statutory language, it stated that the article a before law or 
regulation suggested a concern with discrete directives in 
statutes or administrative regulations rather than more 
generalized provisions of common law.221 
The Court was careful to note that regulations perform 
functions distinct from common law claims, which serve 
important compensatory and remedial ends.222 As for implied 
preemption, it concluded that Congress had provided no evidence 
of a clear and manifest intent to preempt tort claims by 
occupying the field, nor did tort claims conflict with the Act.223 To 
the contrary, the Court recognized that compensating victims 
serve[s] the Acts more prominent objective, emphasized by its 
title, of promoting boating safety.224 It is notable that, like 
Freightliner and Lohr, but unlike Geier and Riegel, the Coast 
Guard had not promulgated a specific safety standard for boat 
propeller blades nor had it argued in favor of preemption.225 
D. Agriculture 
Congress recognized the states historic role in controlling 
agricultural activitiesin particular, the application and use of 
pesticides, herbicides, and other agricultural chemicalswhen it 
passed the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act of 
1972 (FIFRA).226 FIFRA, initially passed in 1947 and amended in 
1972, requires manufacturers to register pesticides before placing 
them on the market.227 The initial statute was a limited attempt 
to address pesticide licensing and labeling, but the 1972 
amendments turned FIFRA into a comprehensive statute, 
resulting in a centralized federal regulatory framework.228 
                                                          
 220. Sprietsma, 537 U.S. at 63. 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. at 70. 
 223. Id. at 69. 
 224. Id. at 70. 
 225. Id. at 6970. However, the court indicated that if, as in Geier, the agency had 
issued an opinion on the preemptive effect of the Act, it might have gone the other way. 
Id. at 70. On agency preemption, see supra note 185. 
 226. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136136y (2006). 
 227. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(a) (2006). 
 228. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 991 (1984); see also Alexandra B. 
Klass, Bees, Trees, Preemption, and Nuisance: A New Path to Resolving Pesticide Land 
Use Disputes, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 763, 77273 (2005) (FIFRA has been called one of the 
most federal of the environmental laws. Unlike [others] . . . FIFRA provides a lesser role 
for state and local governments, creating and maintaining a uniform national system of 
registering and labeling pesticides.). 
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As in the Medical Device Act and the Boat Safety Act, 
Congress carved out a sphere of federal authority without 
eviscerating state authority by including both preemption and 
savings clauses. To ensure nationwide uniformity, the statute 
gives the EPA exclusive power over registration, labeling, and 
packaging requirements. Its preemption clause provides that 
states shall not impose or continue in effect any requirements 
for labeling or packaging in addition to or different from those 
required under [FIFRA].229 Yet FIFRAs savings clause 
authorizes any state to impose additional restrictions on the sale 
or use of pesticides within the state in recognition of regional and 
local factors like climate, geographic variation, population 
density, and water supply.230 
In a 1991 regulatory preemption case, Wisconsin Public 
Intervenor v. Mortier, the Rehnquist Court gave weight to the 
savings clause to afford room for local governments, as political 
subdivisions of states, to restrict or even prohibit aerial spraying 
in order to protect the health of their citizens.231 A pattern of 
treating tort claims more favorably than state regulatory regimes 
would suggest that tort claims for personal injury or property 
damage from pesticide use would fare quite well against 
preemption challenges. However, despite the persuasive, albeit 
not binding, precedent set by Wisconsin Public Intervenor, and 
despite FIFRAs explicit savings clause, after Cipollone was 
handed down in 1992, almost all of the federal courts and many 
state courts held that tort claims related to pesticides were 
preempted.232 In 2005, the Rehnquist Court reversed this trend in 
Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC by allowing claims for crop 
damages allegedly caused by defective design and manufacture of 
herbicides, breach of express warranty, and violation of the Texas 
Deceptive Trade Practices Act.233 According to the Court, the term 
requirements, as used in FIFRAs preemption clause, reaches 
positive enactments as well as other compulsory forms of law, but 
                                                          
 229. 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b) (2006). 
 230. See 7 U.S.C. § 136v(a) (2006) (A State may regulate the sale or use of any 
federally registered pesticide or device in the State, but only if and to the extent the 
regulation does not permit any sale or use prohibited by this subchapter.); see also 7 
U.S.C. § 136v(c)(1) (2006) (A State may provide registration for additional uses of 
federally registered pesticides formulated for distribution and use within that State to 
meet special local needs in accord with the purposes of this subchapter and if registration 
for such use has not previously been denied, disapproved, or canceled by the 
Administrator.). 
 231. Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 60708 (1991) (interpreting 7 
U.S.C. § 136v(a) (2006)); see also infra notes 37375 and accompanying text. 
 232. Klass, supra note 228, at 783. 
 233. Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 444 (2005). 
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does not preclude jury verdicts simply because they might 
motivate an optional decision to revise a label.234 As in Lohr, but 
contrary to Riegel, the Court distinguished the much broader 
language of the preemption clause at issue in Cipollone, 
prohibiting any state requirement or prohibition . . . with 
respect to the advertising or promotion of any cigarettes,235 from 
FIFRAs preemption clause, prohibiting only labeling or 
packaging requirements in addition to or different from federal 
requirements.236 Claims for defective design and manufacture and 
for breach of warranty were not such requirements, but the 
Court drew a distinction for the plaintiffs fraud and failure-to-
warn claims, which would be preempted if they imposed an 
additional or different labeling or packaging obligation than 
FIFRA.237 
The Bates Court gave appropriate regard to the statutory 
savings clause, in large part because the long-standing history of 
state regulation and common law remedies weighed in favor of a 
broad construction. It explained: 
The long history of tort litigation against manufacturers of 
poisonous substances adds force to the basic presumption 
against pre-emption. If Congress had intended to deprive 
injured parties of a long available form of compensation, it 
surely would have expressed that intent more 
clearly. . . . Moreover, this history emphasizes the 
importance of providing an incentive to manufacturers to 
use the utmost care in the business of distributing 
inherently dangerous items.238 
Unlike Cipollone, where the statute prescribed certain 
immutable warning statements, Congress intended pesticide 
labels to evolve over time as more information comes to light 
about the pesticides efficacy and effects.239 As in Sprietsma and 
Lohr, the Court was persuaded that tort remedies would aid, 
rather than obstruct, the functioning of FIFRA and the 
                                                          
 234. Id. at 447. 
 235. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 515 (1992). 
 236. Bates, 544 U.S. at 447 (quoting 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b) (2006)); see also supra notes 
13640 (describing Lohr) and 15360 (describing Riegels construction of the term 
requirements). 
 237. Bates, 544 U.S. at 447. 
 238. Id. at 44950 (citing Silkwood v. KerrMcGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 251 (1984)). 
 239. Id. at 451. 
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accomplishment of congressional goals.240 The Courts rationale 
extends well beyond FIFRA, but it failed to see this in Riegel.241 
E. Harmonizing Common Law Remedies with Federal Law 
In most circumstances, federal regulatory requirements and 
state common law can be easily harmonized. Savings clauses 
reflect congressional recognition that preserving common law 
remedies strengthens the overall stability of the law, both by 
drawing on the unique attributes of different levels and branches 
of government and by providing justice to injured individuals. 
Common law tort claims can serve as a catalyst for regulatory 
evolution and for eventual improvement of a broad range of 
federally regulated items, including pesticides, medical devices, 
and motor vehicles.242 
Statutes that include both preemption and savings clauses, 
such as FIFRA, the Medical Device Act, and the Motor Vehicle 
and Boat Safety Acts, create a conundrum for courts attempting 
to give proper weight to both. The inclusion of a savings clause 
precludes a global finding of express preemption. But when it 
comes to implied preemption, the Supreme Courts approach to 
dueling statutory provisions has, in some cases, treated the 
savings clause not only as nondispositive but as nonexistent. 
Absent a strong backdrop of historic state involvement in areas 
such as agriculture and products liability, the Rehnquist Court in 
its later years was quick to conclude that, read together, 
preemption and savings clauses merely reflect a neutral policy 
toward preemption,243 and the Roberts Court has given every 
indication that it will continue, and perhaps even accentuate, 
this trend.244 
A determination that preemption and savings clauses 
neutralize each other leaves the courts free to look outside the 
statutory text, to ignore congressional objectives, and to place 
weight on pro-business sentiments and on pro-preemption 
arguments advanced by the regulated entities, which wish to 
avoid responsibility for harm caused by their products and 
activities, and by the federal agencies captured by them. The 
result has been to displace any state law that occupies the same 
sphere of influence as the federal law in question, despite 
                                                          
 240. See Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 70 (2002); see also Medtronic, 
Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 50102 (1996). 
 241. See supra Part III.C.1 (discussing Riegel). 
 242. Klass, supra note 19, at 56768. 
 243. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 87071 (2000). 
 244. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 100809 (2008). 
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congressional intent to the contrary and regardless of whether 
the offending state law conflicts with the federal requirement 
or objective. This outcome is just as detrimental for injured 
parties as in Cipollone, where the statute in question included no 
savings clause at all.245 Cipollone can perhaps be rationalized (if 
not justified) by the long history of federal presence in tobacco 
marketing and sales and by Congresss apparent intent to occupy 
the entire field through a pervasive federal regulatory scheme. 
The inclusion of both a savings clause and a preemption clause in 
other areas, however, should not be construed the same way. 
Rather, courts should give savings clauses appropriate weight by 
staying true to the long-standing presumption against 
preemption, particularly where state powers to protect public 
health and welfare are implicated. 
IV. STATE REGULATORY INNOVATIONS 
In the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts, progressive state and 
local regulatory programs have been exceptionally vulnerable to 
judicial preemption despite the presence of statutory savings 
clauses. During the past decade in particular, such regulations 
have been struck down almost without exception whenever they 
would impose greater economic burdens on industry than those 
established by the federal regulatory floor.246 The recent trend, 
which began in the mid-1990s, has prompted some scholars to 
equate the modern day preemption doctrine with the Lochner 
Era of the early 1900s, where the Court employed an array of 
tools to strike down progressive state and local economic and 
social regulation.247 As the states become more aggressive in 
filling gaps left by lax federal regulatory schemes and federal 
enforcement failures, for-profit corporations, developers, and 
other antiregulatory forces have become equally aggressiveand 
quite effectivein wielding preemption as an obstacle to the 
implementation of protective state regulations. 
                                                          
 245. See supra notes 12332 (discussing Cipollone). 
 246. See supra notes 4852 and accompanying text (describing the results of the 
Greve and Klick study, which found that 47.9% of all non-tort cases issued by the 
Rehnquist Court from 1985 to 2003 resulted in preemption); see also infra Part IV.E 
(describing regulatory preemption trend). 
 247. Wolfson, supra note 22, at 69 (citing Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)). 
In rejecting a 2007 dormant commerce clause challenge to a local waste management 
ordinance, the Roberts Court denied any intent to return to the Lochner Era. United 
Haulers Assn, Inc. v. OneidaHerkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 127 S. Ct. 1786, 1798 
(2007). Chief Justice Roberts delivered the Courts decision but did not join in the portion 
of the opinion repudiating Lochner. Id. at 1789. 
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A. Environment and Energy 
1. Nuclear Plants. A high water mark of modern regulatory 
savings clause jurisprudence was a 1983 case involving a states 
moratorium on the construction of nuclear power plants. In 
Pacific Gas & Electric v. State Energy Resources Conservation & 
Development Commission, the Burger Court found that, although 
Congress had provided the federal Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission absolute power to regulate the safety of nuclear 
power, the states retained their traditional authority over 
reliability, cost, and other economic concerns related to 
electricity.248 At issue was a California statute that conditioned 
the construction of nuclear power plants on a finding that 
adequate means of disposal would be available for nuclear waste. 
The Court recognized that, although nuclear energy and nuclear 
waste were areas extensively regulated by the federal 
government, Congress intended to leave sufficient authority to 
allow states to slow or even stop the development of nuclear 
power for economic reasons.249 
Two savings clauses played a role in the resolution of the 
case. The first, found in section 274(k) of the AEA, used broad 
language but was narrowly circumscribed to apply only to the 
particular topic addressed in that section, that is, certain 
federalstate agreements: Nothing in this section shall be 
construed to affect the authority of any State or local agency to 
regulate activities for purposes other than protection against 
radiation hazards.250 The Court was willing to consider it for 
guidance, even though it was not applicable to the California 
statute at issue. It recognized that Congress, by permitting 
regulation for purposes other than protection against radiation 
hazards underscored the distinction . . . between the spheres of 
activity left respectively to the Federal Government and the 
States.251 It then turned to the more generally applicable savings 
clause of section 271 of the AEA: Nothing in this chapter shall 
be construed to affect the authority or regulations of any Federal, 
State, or local agency with respect to the generation, sale, or 
transmission of electric power produced through the use of 
nuclear facilities licensed by the Commission.252 The Court 
                                                          
 248. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Commn, 461 
U.S. 190, 205 (1983). 
 249. Id. 
 250. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(k) (2000) (State regulation of activities for certain purposes). 
 251. Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at 210. 
 252. 42 U.S.C. § 2018 (2000) (Agency jurisdiction). 
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concluded that this provision removed any doubt that questions 
of ratemaking and the public need for additional power plants 
were to remain in state hands.253 It then engaged in an unusual 
foray into the legislative history of the California statute to find a 
nonsafety rationale for the moratorium. An Assembly Report 
provided the sought-after economic justification that [w]ithout a 
permanent means of disposal, the nuclear waste problem 
could . . . lead[ ] to unpredictably high [electricity] costs.254 
The Court expressly noted that a dangerous gap would be 
left in the regulatory framework if states were stripped of power 
over the construction of new plants: 
While the NRC does evaluate the dangers of generating 
nuclear power, it does not balance those dangers against 
the risks, costs, and benefits of other choices available to 
the State . . . . It is almost inconceivable that Congress 
would have left a regulatory vacuum; the only reasonable 
inference is that Congress intended the States to continue 
to make these judgments.255 
Nearly three decades after the Pacific Gas decision, the 
United States has yet to provide a permanent nuclear waste 
repository, while spent fuel rods from the nations reactors 
continue to accumulate. The potential consequences of improper 
storage and disposal cry out for a federal solution, but so long as 
none is forthcoming states like California have struggled to fill, 
or at least alleviate, the regulatory gap by limiting nuclear 
reactor construction or expansion and by restricting the 
transportation and disposal of nuclear waste.256 Other than 
construction moratoria, states have been rebuked at nearly every 
turn by the lower courts, which have invalidated state 
requirements notwithstanding the Supreme Courts admonition 
against congressional occupation of the field.257 The inclusion of 
                                                          
 253. See Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at 21011 (examining Section 271 in light of 
congressional intent). 
 254. Id. at 21314. 
 255. Id. at 208, 225. 
 256. See Angela Cole Bonstead, EPAs Mixed Approach to Mixed Waste, 8 ENVTL. 
LAW. 521, 54546 (2002) (discussing interplay between federal and state regulations). 
 257. See, e.g., Skull Valley Band of Goshute Indians v. Nielson, 376 F.3d 1223, 1227 
(10th Cir. 2004) (holding that Utah statutes regulating the storage and transportation of 
spent nuclear fuel [were] preempted by federal law), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1060 (2005); 
United States v. Kentucky, 252 F.3d 816, 82023 (6th Cir. 2001) (finding that federal law 
preempted environmental permit conditions imposed by Kentucky regarding disposal of 
radioactive waste); United States v. Manning, 434 F. Supp. 2d 988, 1006 (E.D. Wash. 
2006) (concluding that a Washington law regulating mixed wastes was invalid on grounds 
of federal preemption); Abraham v. Hodges, 255 F. Supp. 2d 539, 549 (D.S.C. 2002) 
(invalidating a state ban on the United States transportation of plutonium on South 
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explicit savings clauses in the AEA and the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA),258 which regulates waste 
management, seems to make no difference.259 By authorizing 
supplemental state regulation of hazardous waste management, 
the RCRAs savings clause is more encompassing than the 
AEAs.260 However, the comprehensiveness of RCRA, which was 
intended to provide federal cradle to grave regulation of 
hazardous wastes,261 raises the specter of implied preemption, 
allowing regulated entities to successfully challenge state and 
local efforts to restrict hazardous waste disposal, including 
nuclear waste.262 This trend is consistent with more recent cases 
of the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts, which have been more 
inclined to invalidate state regulatory programs on preemption 
grounds in the years following Pacific Gas. 
2. Air and Water Pollution. The wreck of the Exxon Valdez 
motivated coastal states from Alaska to Florida to enact oil spill 
legislation. Some of these statutes impose preventative measures 
while others impose liability on the vessel owner and operator for 
cleanup costs and other damages.263 The OPA has been given 
                                                          
Carolina roadways). 
 258. 42 U.S.C. §§ 69016992k (2000). Like the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water 
Act, RCRA authorizes states to maintain a substantial role in regulating hazardous 
waste, 42 U.S.C. § 6926 (2000), and cedes states the primary role in managing solid 
waste. 42 U.S.C. § 6901 (2000). However, it leaves the regulation of nuclear waste to the 
AEA. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27) (2000). 
 259. Spence & Murray, supra note 39, at 114849; Melissa Beutler Orien, Battle over 
Control of Low-Level Radioactive Waste: Some States Are Overstepping Their Bounds, 
2005 B.Y.U. L. REV. 155, 189 (2005). 
 260. See 42 U.S.C. § 6929 (2000) ([N]o State or political subdivision may impose any 
requirements less stringent than those authorized under this subchapter . . . . Nothing in 
this chapter shall be construed to prohibit any State or political subdivision thereof from 
imposing any requirements, including those for site selection, which are more stringent 
than those imposed by such regulations.). 
 261. Chicago v. Envtl. Def. Fund, 511 U.S. 328, 331 (1994). 
 262. See, e.g., Blue Circle Cement, Inc. v. Bd. of County Commrs, 27 F.3d 1499, 1508 
(10th Cir. 1994) (holding that a conditional use permit that resulted in a de facto ban on 
disposal conflicted with RCRAs goals); ENSCO, Inc. v. Dumas, 807 F.2d 743, 745 (8th 
Cir. 1986) (invalidating a local ordinance prohibiting the storage, treatment, or disposal of 
acute hazardous waste as implicitly preempted); Ogden Envtl. Servs. v. City of San 
Diego, 687 F. Supp. 1436, 1448 (S.D. Cal. 1988) (holding that a citys denial of a permit for 
a waste facility was implicitly preempted). Discriminatory state and local waste 
regulations have also been struck down on dormant Commerce Clause grounds. See, e.g., 
C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 391 (1994) (holding a flow 
control ordinance violated the dormant Commerce Clause). But see United Haulers Assn, 
Inc. v. OneidaHerkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 127 S. Ct. 1786, 1795 (2007) 
(upholding a flow ordinance that favored a county-run facility over private facilities as a 
nondiscriminatory governmental exercise of power with only incidental burdens on 
interstate commerce). 
 263. See 2 DANIEL P. SELMI & KENNETH A. MANASTER, STATE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
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broad preemptive effect in the regulatory context, even though 
common law claims for damages caused by oil spills have 
generally survived preemption challenges.264 
As is typical of other environmental statutes, the OPA 
envisions a role for state regulators and includes an explicit 
savings clause for protective state requirements.265 When it comes 
to regulating vessel safety, however, the notion of cooperative 
federalism is illusory at best. In United States v. Locke, the 
Rehnquist Court displaced Washingtons requirements for 
navigation watch procedures, training requirements for crew 
members, and maritime casualty reporting.266 The Ports and 
Waterways Safety Act, as amended by the OPA, authorizes the 
federal government to regulate the design, construction, 
operation, and staffing of tanker vessels,267 but retains the states 
authority to impose additional liabilities and to regulate matters 
reflective of local peculiarities of their ports and waterways.268 In 
striking down Washingtons requirements, the Court explained 
away the statutory savings clause by finding that its placement 
in Title I limited its scope to oil pollution liability and 
compensation, while vessel-manning requirements are contained 
in Title II, which includes no savings clause.269 
Moreover, according to the Court, giving broad effect to the 
savings clause would disrupt national uniformity and upset 
the careful regulatory scheme established by federal law.270 It 
                                                          
§§ 18:2, 18:1418:26 (2007) (surveying state law approaches to oil spills); Daniel G. Rauh, 
State Authority Under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990: Federalist Elixir, or Should the 
Supreme Court Sink Intertanko v. Locke?, 24 TUL. MAR. L.J. 323, 329 n.42 (1999) (citing, 
for example, HAW. REV. STAT. § 128D-6 (2006); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 21E, § 5 (2002)). 
 264. See supra notes 7991 and accompanying text (describing the Exxon Valdez 
incident and ensuing litigation). 
 265. 33 U.S.C. § 2718(a) (2006) (preserving state authority to impose additional 
liability or requirements relating to discharges of oil or removal of such discharges); see 
also Ray v. Atl. Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 171 (1978) (finding that Title I of the Ports 
and Waterways Safety Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1221, 1223 (2006), preserves state 
authority over matters reflective of local peculiarities). 
 266. United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 11315 (2000). 
 267. 46 U.S.C. § 3703(a) (2000). 
 268. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a) (2006); see also Atlantic Richfield, 435 U.S. at 171 
(upholding a state tanker law as reflective of the peculiarities of local waters). 
 269. Locke, 529 U.S. at 105. 
 270. Id. at 106. A district court in Michigan distinguished Locke in finding that state 
law requirements for ballast water treatment to prevent introduction of invasive species 
into state waters was not preempted by the National Invasive Species Act (NISA), which 
allows alternative methods of treatment so long as they are deemed to be at least as 
effective as saltwater exchange. Fednav, Ltd. v. Chester, 505 F. Supp. 2d 381, 39596 
(E.D. Mich. 2007) (citing 16 U.S.C. § 4711(b)(2)(B) (2006)), affd, 547 F.3d 607 (6th Cir. 
2008). The court was willing to give NISAs savings clause greater weight than was 
afforded the clause at issue in Locke, because the NISA clause was located in the same 
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found the presumption against preemption inapplicable when the 
state regulates activities marked by a history of substantial 
federal presence, such as maritime law.271 Ironically, the Court 
concluded that, in contrast, a restrictive reading of the savings 
clause best respected a federalstate balance, stripping the states 
of their ability to control important aspects of passage to their 
ports and harbors.272 
State regulatory programs governing other types of 
interstate pollution have fared relatively poorly since the mid-
1990s as well. In one of the last major environmental cases of the 
Rehnquist Court, an air quality ordinance that attempted to 
control emissions from vehicles was struck down on preemption 
grounds.273 As in the OPA, RCRA, and the Clean Water Act, 
Congress embraced a cooperative federalism model in the Clean 
Air Act to preserve the authority of the states to make policy 
decisions within their borders while authorizing the EPA to 
establish national ambient air quality standards and certain 
emission limitations.274 A key feature of this approach is the 
ability of states to adopt their own state implementation plans to 
meet national air quality standards by controlling source-by-
source emissions in a fashion that balances the states own 
economic and environmental concerns.275 Statutory savings 
clauses within the Clean Air Act explicitly retain states latitude 
to implement air quality requirements for factories, power 
plants, and other stationary sources.276 The Act includes a 
savings clause applicable to motor vehicles as well, but the 
Supreme Court has given this provision short shrift.277 
In Engine Manufacturers Assn v. South Coast Air Quality 
Management District, the Court, at the behest of a trade 
                                                          
chapter as the substantive ballast water regulation, indicating that a role for the states 
was forefront in the minds of the drafters of NISA. Id. at 396 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 4725 
(2006)). 
 271. Locke, 529 U.S. at 106, 10809. 
 272. Id. at 10809. 
 273. Engine Mfrs. Assn v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 246, 255 
(2004). 
 274. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 661 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(including the CAA as an example of cooperative federalism); Sierra Club v. EPA, 315 
F.3d 1295, 1300 (11th Cir. 2002) (describing division of labor between states and the 
EPA as inherent in the regime of cooperative federalism created by the CAA); Michigan 
v. EPA, 268 F.3d 1075, 1083 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (describing the CAA as an experiment in 
cooperative federalism); Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 82 F.3d 451, 46869 (D.C. Cir. 
1996) (discussing CAAs program of federal and state cooperation and planning). 
 275. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(k) (2000). 
 276. See supra notes 5964 and accompanying text (discussing CAA savings clauses 
and state actions to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in effort to combat climate change). 
 277. 42 U.S.C. § 7543(d) (2000). 
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association representing manufacturers of diesel engines, 
invalidated an ordinance requiring local fleet operators to 
purchase or lease only vehicles that met stringent emission 
standards.278 The ordinance was adopted by Californias South 
Coast Air Quality District, which is one of the most polluted 
regions in the United States due in large part to excessive vehicle 
traffic. The manufacturers relied on a preemption clause found in 
Section 209(a) to challenge the regulation: No State or any 
political subdivision thereof shall adopt or attempt to enforce any 
standard relating to the control of emissions from new motor 
vehicles or new motor vehicle engines subject to this part.279 To 
offset this provision, Section 209(d) incorporates a savings clause 
that explicitly allows states otherwise to control, regulate, or 
restrict the use, operation, or movement of vehicles.280 Through 
Section 209, Congress acted to prevent states from imposing 
production mandates that would cause undue economic strain 
on the industry by forcing vehicle manufacturers to produce 
engines with state-specific characteristics as a condition of sale.281 
According to the Supreme Court, the South Coast Districts 
regulation was a standard within the preemption provision of 
Section 209(a).282 Rather than looking closely at the statute itself, 
the Court invoked Websters Dictionary, which defines standard 
as that which is established by authority, custom, or general 
consent, as a model or example; criterion; test.283 This generic 
definition freed the Court to find that a standard is a standard 
even when not enforced through manufacturer-directed 
regulation, and to ignore the savings clause, which would 
seemingly preserve a local requirement that certain types of 
vehicles be used within the district.284 
In dissent, Justice Souter criticized the majoritys unduly 
broad construction of the term standard as violating the plain 
meaning of Section 209(a).285 As Justice Souter also noted, the 
majority ignored the presumption that the historic police powers 
of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless 
that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.286 
                                                          
 278. Engine Mfrs. Assn, 541 U.S. at 255. 
 279. 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) (2000). 
 280. 42 U.S.C. § 7543(d) (2000). 
 281. Engine Mfrs. Assn, 541 U.S at 261 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
 282. Id. at 25254 (majority opinion). 
 283. Id. at 253. (citing WEBSTERS INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2455 (2d ed. 1945)). 
 284. Id. at 254. 
 285. Id. at 263 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 286. Id. at 260 (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996)). The state 
of California was not a party to the Engine Manufacturers case, but it filed an Amicus 
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Section 209 may not be a model of clarity, as Justice Souter 
noted, but tie breakers in interpreting statutes that are 
unsystematic, redundant, and fuzzy about drawing lines must 
cut in favor of sustaining more protective state and local rules.287 
Local rules that motivate, but do not compel, manufacturers to 
develop and market vehicles that meet stringent emission 
controls are consistent both with congressional intent regarding 
motor vehicle emissions and the overall purposes of the statute, 
which sought to rectify states unwillingness or inability to 
address air pollution problems, not to restrict their efforts.288 
Although the South Coast District experience demonstrates 
that air pollution is both a local and a national problem and that 
solutions are necessary at both levels, it might seem 
counterintuitive to say that local governments can play an 
important role in addressing regional or global issues such as 
smog or climate change. However, both common law remedies 
and state and local regulatory programs have proven necessary 
to fill the regulatory gap left by the federal failure to take a 
meaningful stance, particularly on greenhouse gas emissions. 
Acting alone, local air quality initiatives may have very little 
impact on overall emission reductions, but they may trigger 
action at the national level. As Professors David Adelman and 
Kirsten Engel have explained, environmental law is replete with 
examples where state and local initiatives successfully motivated 
a comprehensive federal regulatory response on topics ranging 
from acid rain to mercury emissions.289 As for preemption, 
although the Court struck down a local ordinance related to 
vehicle emissions, there is reason to believe that state and local 
restrictions on emissions from stationary sources, like power 
plants, are less vulnerable to invalidation given the broad 
savings clauses,290 historic state and local presence in regulating 
stationary sources, and absence of a countervailing federal 
interest in transportation efficiencies and nationwide vehicle 
                                                          
Curiae brief in support of the South Coast Air Quality District. See Brief for the State of 
California as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, supra note 48. 
 287. Engine Mfrs. Assn, 541 U.S. at 266 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 288. Lin, supra note 30, at 584. 
 289. David E. Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel, Adaptive Federalism, Preemption Choice 
and Regulatory Dynamism, in PREEMPTION CHOICE: THE THEORY, LAW, AND REALITY OF 
FEDERALISMS CORE QUESTION, supra note 37, at 277, 371; Kirsten Engel, State and Local 
Climate Change Initiatives: What Is Motivating State and Local Governments to Address a 
Global Problem and What Does This Say About Federalism and Environmental Law?, 38 
URB. LAW. 1015, 102627 (2006). 
 290. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7604(e), 7416 (2000); see supra notes 6064 and accompanying text 
(discussing state action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in an effort to combat climate 
change). 
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manufacturing standards. The Supreme Court has yet to resolve 
the issue, but state and local restrictions on stationary source 
emissions of greenhouse gases should be saved from preemption 
under the Clean Air Act.291 
Congresss desire to adopt a cooperative federalism 
approach is also evidenced by several savings clauses in the 
Clean Water Act of 1972 (CWA).292 Although Congress 
constrained states rights to some extent by creating mandatory 
federal permit programs to regulate discharges of pollutants into 
water,293 it explicitly provided states with the power to impose 
tougher pollution standards than required by the Act.294 States 
and tribes that meet statutorily delineated criteria are 
authorized to accept delegations to administer the permit 
programs and take enforcement actions against noncomplying 
sources.295 Upon delegation, the EPAs permit program is 
suspended, but the EPA may still veto proposed permits and 
must periodically review state or tribal administration to ensure 
compliance.296 States also retain almost exclusive responsibility 
for pollution from diffuse, nonpoint sources.297 Finally, Congress 
empowered states to condition federally issued licenses on 
compliance with state water quality standards.298 In addition, the 
CWA provides that a states authority to allocate quantities of 
water within its jurisdiction shall not be superseded, abrogated 
or otherwise impaired, and that nothing should be construed to 
supersede or abrogate state-sanctioned water rights.299 
As a result of these provisions, federal and state powers 
overlap considerably with regard to a broad array of activities 
affecting coastal waters, inland navigable waters, and adjacent 
wetlands. The savings clauses have taken prominence when 
private property interests in water and wetlands are implicated. 
Perversely, a broad construction of the CWAs savings clauses 
has resulted in antiregulatory consequences: federal regulation is 
                                                          
 291. See Robert L. Glicksman & Richard E. Levy, A Collective Action Perspective on 
Ceiling Preemption by Federal Environmental Regulation: The Case of Global Climate 
Change, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 579, 616, 648 (2008) (describing state efforts to control 
greenhouse gas emissions from stationary sources and explaining why the preemption 
arguments of regulated entities should be rejected). 
 292. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251(g), 1365(e), 1370 (2006); see also supra Part III.A.1 (describing 
the Supreme Courts treatment of tort claims under the CWA savings clauses). 
 293. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1342, 1344 (2006). 
 294. 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (2006). 
 295. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1342(a)(5), 1370, 1377(e) (2006). 
 296. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c) (2006). 
 297. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1313, 1342(a) (2006). 
 298. 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1) (2006). 
 299. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(g) (2006). 
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defeated even when state regulation is absent. Rather than 
providing more protection to the nations fresh water resources, 
under the guise of federalism, the construction of the CWAs 
savings clauses by both the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts has 
resulted in less protection. 
In two such cases, the Court took the opportunity to shrink 
federal power by emphasizing the states primary state 
responsibility for ordinary land-use decisions.300 Although both 
cases involved the construction of the Acts jurisdictional reach to 
waters of the U.S., rather than preemption per se, in both cases 
developers championed states rights in a coordinated strategy to 
strip the United States of authority to protect isolated wetlands 
and nonperennial streams. In a 2006 opinion by the Roberts 
Court, Rapanos v. United States, developers found a steadfast 
friend in Justice Scalia.301 Citing the statutory savings clause as 
well as a previous prodevelopment decision of the Rehnquist 
Court, Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County (SWANCC) 
v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,302 Scalia cloaked his analysis in 
the language of federalism: 
[T]he Governments expansive interpretation would result 
in a significant impingement of the States traditional and 
primary power over land and water use. Regulation of land 
use, as through the issuance of the development 
permits . . . is a quintessential state and local power. . . . We 
ordinarily expect a clear and manifest statement from 
Congress to authorize an unprecedented intrusion into 
traditional state authority.303 
In rejecting arguments that comprehensive federal 
regulation was needed to achieve the CWAs goals, Justice Scalia 
speculated, It is not clear that the state and local conservation 
efforts that the CWA explicitly calls for . . . are in any way 
inadequate for the goal of preservation.304 As the Court itself may 
have recognized in a 1985 case that extended federal jurisdiction 
                                                          
 300. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 756 (2006); see also Solid Waste Agency 
of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engrs (SWANCC), 531 U.S. 159, 174 (2001) 
(recognizing states traditional role in regulating land and water use). Both cases mark a 
significant departure from United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 
(1985), where the federal assertion of authority over wetlands adjacent to navigable 
waters was upheld in a unanimous opinion penned by Justice White. 
 301. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 71516. 
 302. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 174. 
 303. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 73738 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (2006) (It is the policy 
of the Congress to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights 
of States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution, [and] to plan the development and 
use . . . of land and water resources . . . .)). 
 304. Id. at 745. 
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to adjacent wetlands, United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 
Inc., the evidence does not support this assertion.305 State 
capabilities for wetlands protection vary tremendously, and 
someperhaps moststates have fallen short of meeting the 
statutory goals of maintaining and enhancing the integrity of 
water resources.306 Notably, in Rapanos, thirty-three States, the 
District of Columbia, the Association of State Wetland Managers, 
and the Association of State Floodplain Managers filed amicus 
briefs on behalf of the United States, seeking to maintain broad 
federal jurisdiction over wetlands.307 This sends a clear signal 
that most states believe that preserving wetlands from 
development is best accomplished by the federal government, 
which is better able to withstand pressure from local developers 
and property owners. The states concern is well placed. In the 
absence of federal regulation, the contiguous United States has 
lost over fifty percent of its wetlands since industrialization 
began, and some states have lost as much as ninety percent.308 
Yet in Rapanos, the Court discounted the states concerns and 
made little effort to judge the issues according to institutional 
competency. It also gave short shrift to legislative history replete 
with evidence of congressional intent to extend federal 
jurisdiction as far as constitutionally permissible in order to 
achieve the environmental goals of the Act.309 
                                                          
 305. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 139. 
 306. Clifford Rechtschaffen, Enforcing the Clean Water Act in the Twenty-First 
Century: Harnessing the Power of the Public Spotlight, 55 ALA. L. REV. 775, 784 (2004). 
 307. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 71920, 737. 
 308. Ohio State Research News, Wetland Loss Still Outweighs Gain Despite 20 Years 
of Progress, http://researchnews.osu.edu/archive/mitigate.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2009) 
(citing NATL RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMPENSATING FOR WETLAND LOSSES UNDER THE 
CLEAN WATER ACT 16 (2002)); see also U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., GEOGRAPHICALLY 
ISOLATED WETLANDS: A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF THEIR CHARACTERISTICS AND 
STATUS IN SELECTED AREAS OF THE UNITED STATES § 3 (2002), available at 
http://www.fws.gov/nwi/PubsReports/isolated/isolated_no_images.pdf. (studying selected 
wetland areas within each state); PAT PARENTEAU, ASSN OF STATE WETLANDS MANAGERS 
& THE ASSN OF STATE FLOODPLAIN MANAGERS, POSITION PAPER ON CLEAN WATER ACT 
JURISDICTION DETERMINATIONS PURSUANT TO THE SUPREME COURTS JANUARY 9, 2001 
DECISION, SOLID WASTE OF NORTHERN COOK COUNTY V. UNITED STATES ARMY CORPS OF 
ENGINEERS (SWANCC) 5 (2001), available at http://www.aswm.org/fwp/swancc/ 
position.pdf (supporting clear regulatory guidance). According to the U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service, wetland acreage has diminished to the point where environmental and 
even socio-economic benefits (i.e. ground water supply and water quality, shoreline 
erosion, floodwater storage and trapping of sediments, and climatic changes) are now 
seriously threatened. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Wetland Threats and Loss: 
Wetlands Losses in the United States: 1780s to 1980s, 
http://wetlandextension.ifas.ufl.edu/threats.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2009). 
 309. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 78788 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Solid Waste Agency of N. 
Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engrs (SWANCC), 531 U.S. 159, 17576 (2001) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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In another 2006 case, S.D. Warren Co. v. Maine Board of 
Environmental Protection, the Court bowed to a states authority 
to impose conditions on a federally licensed hydropower dam.310 
This time, the State had affirmatively asserted its power to 
protect the environment from the adverse effects of dam 
operations, utilizing the explicit authority of Section 401 of the 
CWA, which requires state certification of any federal activity 
that may result in any discharge into navigable waters.311 The 
Maine Department of Environmental Protection found that the 
dam in question had dried up long stretches of the river, ruining 
fish habitats and eliminating fishing and other recreational 
opportunities on the river.312 The States certification required the 
dam operator to maintain minimum flows and to allow passage 
for fish and eels. In contrast to Rapanos, in the S.D. Warren case, 
the United States weighed in as amicus curiae in support of the 
State of Maine.313 
In upholding Maines certification requirement, the Roberts 
Court explained: 
State certifications under § 401 are essential in the scheme 
to preserve state authority to address the broad range of 
pollution, as Senator Muskie explained . . . when what is 
now § 401 was first proposed: No polluter will be able to 
hide behind a Federal license or permit as an excuse for a 
violation of water quality standard[s]. . . . No State water 
pollution control agency will be confronted with a fait 
accompli by an industry that has built a plant without 
consideration of water quality requirements.314 
Foreshadowing its subsequent decision in Rapanos, the 
Court stated that [c]hanges in the river like these fall within a 
States legitimate legislative business, and the Clean Water Act 
                                                          
 310. S.D. Warren Co. v. Maine Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 547 U.S. 370, 373 (2006). 
 311. 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1) (2006). 
 312. S.D. Warren, 547 U.S. at 38586. 
 313. Id. at 372. 
 314. Id. at 386 (citations omitted). The Court followed PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County 
v. Washington Department of Ecology, where it upheld a states stream flow requirements 
as consistent with its Section 401 authority to prevent the degradation of water quality. 
PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v. Wash. Dept. of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 723 (1994). 
Notably, in PUD No. 1, Justices Thomas and Scalia argued that the Federal Power Act 
preempted the ability of states to impose minimum stream limits on FERC licensed 
projects under CWA Section 401. Id. at 734 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (Today, the Court 
gives the States precisely the veto power over hydroelectric projects that we determined 
in [prior cases] they did not possess.). The Court has consistently recognized the 
regulation of utilities as a traditional state police power. See Ark. Elec. Coop. Corp. v. Ark. 
Pub. Serv. Commn, 461 U.S. 375, 377 (1983); Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. 
Conservation & Dev. Commn, 461 U.S. 190, 211 (1983). 
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provides for a system that respects the States concerns.315 
Accordingly, it construed Section 401 in a way that best 
preserves the state authority apparently intended by 
Congress.316 The subtext of all three of these casesa recognition 
of traditional state regulatory power over both land use 
development and electric utilitieshelps make sense of S.D. 
Warren, Rapanos, and SWANCC.317 
Outside of the Section 401 context, however, state regulation 
of the hydroelectric industry had been questioned in a line of 
Supreme Court cases involving not the CWA but the Federal 
Power Act of 1920.318 The Federal Power Act requires any 
nonfederal entity seeking to build or operate a hydroelectric 
project to comply with federal licensing requirements.319 In a 1946 
case, First Iowa Hydro-Electric Cooperative v. Federal Power 
Commission, the project proponent proposed to divert nearly the 
entire flow of the Cedar River, but, as in Maine, Iowa law 
required water to be returned to the stream without being 
materially diminished in quantity or polluted or rendered 
deleterious to fish life.320 Not surprisingly, the state opposed the 
project, but the Court held that Iowa law was preempted, despite 
two savings clauses in the Act. The Court construed the first 
clause, that an applicant supply the Commission with evidence of 
compliance with the requirements of state law, as merely 
suggesting subjects as to which the Commission may wish some 
proof submitted to it of the applicants progress.321 The second 
clause was given short shrift as well. The Court treated the 
provision, which stated that the Act should not be construed as 
interfering with state laws relating to the control, appropriation, 
use or distribution of water in irrigation or for municipal or other 
uses, as protecting only proprietary water rights rather than 
                                                          
 315. S.D. Warren, 547 U.S. at 386. 
 316. Id. at 387. 
 317. Compare id. at 38687, with Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 738 (2006) 
(private developers need not obtain a federal permit to drain and fill isolated wetlands or 
ephemeral streams), and Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of 
Engrs (SWANCC), 531 U.S. 159, 174 (2001) (similar). 
 318. 16 U.S.C. §§ 791a823d; see, e.g., First Iowa Hydro-Elec. Coop. v. Fed. Power 
Commn, 328 U.S. 152, 17980 (1946) (discussing history and purposes of the Federal 
Water Power Act); United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 42628 
(1940). See generally Michael P. Healy, The Attraction and Limits of Textualism: The 
Supreme Court Decision in PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v. Washington Department of 
Ecology, 5 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 382 (1996) (assessing tension between the Federal Power 
Act and the CWA). 
 319. 16 U.S.C. § 817 (2006). 
 320. First Iowa Hydro-Elec. Coop., 328 U.S. at 16466. 
 321. Id. at 178. 
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general state authorities over water usage.322 To hold otherwise, 
according to the Court, would destroy the effectiveness of the 
Federal Power Act by subordinating the Commissions judgment 
to the state and negating its purpose of promoting a 
comprehensive national regulatory scheme for full development 
of the nations water resources.323 The Courts ruling in First Iowa 
thus placed the Commission in sole command of hydropower 
licensing, freeing it from impediments caused by any shared 
decisionmaking with the states in the licensing process.324 
Congress subsequently amended the Federal Power Act to 
explicitly require the Commission (now known as the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)) to accept any conditions 
on licenses recommended by state, tribal, or federal agencies, or 
explain in writing why it rejected them.325 After passage of the 
amendments, the Rehnquist Court had an opportunity to 
reexamine the Acts preemptive effect in California v. FERC.326 
When California sought to impose higher minimum streamflows 
on a federally licensed project to protect in-stream values, the 
Court held once again that state-mandated minimum 
streamflows would conflict with congressional objectives by 
effectively allowing California to veto the project.327 It reaffirmed 
First Iowa over the objections of all fifty states.328 
To some extent, states have been able to accomplish through 
CWA Section 401 what they could not do under the Federal 
Power Act.329 Although the power given to states under CWA 
                                                          
 322. Id. at 17576. 
 323. Id. at 164, 180 (describing the Federal Power Act as a complete scheme of 
national regulation which would promote the comprehensive development of the water 
resources of the Nation, in so far as it was within the reach of the federal power to do so). 
 324. Charles R. Sensiba, Whos in Charge Here? The Shrinking Role of the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission in Hydropower Relicensing, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 603, 615 
(1999); see also William L. Plouffe, Forty Years After First Iowa: A Call for Greater State 
Control of River Resources, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 833, 83637 (1986) (analyzing the effects 
of the First Iowa opinion). 
 325. 16 U.S.C. § 803(j) (2006). 
 326. California v. FERC, 495 U.S. 490, 49394 (1990). 
 327. Id. at 49496, 50007. 
 328. Id. at 49293, 505. The Court distinguished the more deferential language of 
the Reclamation Act, which requires the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation to proceed in 
conformity with state laws governing the use and allocation of water. Id. at 50405 
(citing California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 67475 (1978)). California v. FERC was 
also distinct from the regulation at issue in Arkansas Electric Cooperative Corp. v. 
Arkansas Public Service Commission, 461 U.S. 375, 38687 (1983), in which the Court 
held that the Federal Power Act did not preempt state regulation of rural cooperative 
wholesale power rates absent a showing that the state rates appreciably disrupted 
interstate electricity markets. 
 329. See S.D. Warren Co. v. Maine Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 547 U.S. 370, 373 (2006) 
(requiring state approval for dams which discharge into a states navigable waters). 
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Section 401 seems to contradict the constraints on state power 
imposed by the Federal Power Act, the Supreme Court has yet to 
resolve a direct conflict between the two. In a 1994 Washington 
case, hydropower operators asserted Federal Power Act 
preemption arguments in an attempt to defeat restrictive state 
conditions issued under CWA Section 401, but where FERC had 
not yet acted on their hydropower license application, the Court 
found that the two statutory schemes could be reconciled.330 It 
explained that FERC might eventually deny the hydropower 
application or, alternatively, given that FERC is required to give 
equal consideration to the protection of fish habitat . . . any 
FERC license would contain the same conditions as the state 
§ 401 certification.331 Notably, in the Washington case, FERC 
went on record as having no objection to the conditions contained 
in the states Section 401 certification.332 The Court noted, 
however, that if FERC were to issue a license containing 
streamflow conditions that contradicted the states certification 
requirements, the hydropower operators could pursue their 
preemption arguments at that time.333 
Like the Federal Power Act, federal flood control acts 
explicitly assume federal responsibility for flood control 
measures.334 The Act of 1936, in particular, gives the U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers virtually unbridled discretion by authorizing 
it to proceed with a project whenever the benefits to whomsoever 
they may accrue are in excess of the estimated costs.335 Passage 
of the Act raised federalism concerns because the states were 
apprehensive about retaining control over land use and water 
resources development.336 To alleviate these concerns, Congress 
declared a policy of recogniz[ing] the interests and rights of the 
States in determining the development of the watersheds within 
their borders and likewise their interests and rights in water 
utilization and control.337 Despite this savings clause, the Court 
                                                          
 330. PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v. Wash. Dept of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 72122 
(1994). In PUD No. 1, the state of Washington imposed minimum stream flows under 
CWA Section 401 to enforce a designated use contained in a state water quality standard. 
Id. at 70509. 
 331. Id. at 722. 
 332. Id. 
 333. Id. at 723 (citing Escondido Mut. Water Co. v. La Jolla Band of Mission Indians, 
466 U.S. 765, 778 n.20 (1984)). 
 334. 33 U.S.C. § 701a-1 (2006). 
 335. 33 U.S.C. § 701a (2006). For a critique of this open-ended authority, see Zellmer, 
supra note 12. 
 336. ETSI Pipeline Project v. Missouri, 484 U.S. 495, 50203 (1988). 
 337. 33 U.S.C. § 701-1 (2006). This 1944 amendment came on the heels of the Courts 
opinion in Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508, 516 (1941), 
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has routinely affirmed the Corps power over matters that affect 
state prerogatives.338 In ETSI Pipeline Project v. Missouri, the 
State of South Dakota had granted ETSI a permit to withdraw 
water from Lake Oahe for a coal slurry pipeline, and the 
Department of the Interior acquiesced.339 The project was 
invalidated by the Rehnquist Court, which found that the 
Interior lacked the power to authorize the project without 
obtaining the approval of the Secretary of the Army because the 
Flood Control Act had given the Corps predominant authority 
over flood control reservoirs such as Lake Oahe.340 The 
preemption of state law was not directly at issue, but in a type of 
backdoor preemption ruling, the Court gave only passing 
mention to South Dakotas interest in preserving the integrity of 
its permitting decisions and no mention whatsoever to the 
statutory savings clause.341 
At first blush, it seems difficult if not impossible to square 
the Courts sanctioning of strong federal preemptive powers 
under the Flood Control Act and the Federal Power Act with its 
deferential approach to state and local prerogatives for wetland 
and floodplain development under the CWA.342 Close 
consideration of these lines of cases, however, reveals a 
consistent prodevelopment pattern, where state regulations that 
promote land use development and private water rights 
necessary for development have fared relatively well in surviving 
displacement by preemption. The Supreme Courts rationale for 
favoring states rights in the prodevelopment cases is two-fold. It 
relies both on textual analysisCongress has been most careful 
to include strongly worded savings clauses in these areasand 
on the historic backdrop of strong state authority over both land 
use and water rights. Beyond the CWA, at least thirty-six other 
federal statutes expressly save state laws protective of water 
                                                          
which upheld federal supremacy over flood control projects on navigable waters. Robert 
W. Adler, Addressing Barriers to Watershed Protection, 25 ENVTL. L. 973, 1028 & n.317 
(1995). 
 338. Reed D. Benson, Deflating the Deference Myth: National Interests vs. State 
Authority Under Federal Laws Affecting Water Use, 2006 Utah L. Rev. 241, 29798. 
 339. ETSI Pipeline Project, 484 U.S. at 49798. 
 340. Id. at 51112. 
 341. See id. at 498 n.2 (disclaiming any need to weigh the relative interests of the 
United States and the state of South Dakota in Oahe water).  
 342. See Healy, supra note 318, at 39195 (describing tension between federal and 
state regulators created by the Federal Power Act and the CWA). The ETSI case is an 
anomaly, in that it not only pitted two federal agencies against each other but it also 
pitted the development interests of South Dakota, the upstream state, against the 
development interests of the downstream states of Missouri, Iowa, and Nebraska. 
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rights and development,343 demonstrating what the Court has 
called a consistent thread of purposeful and continued deference 
to state water law.344 As a result, irrigators with state-sanctioned 
rights to use water and developers with property interests in 
wetlands and floodplain land have been emboldened to assert 
states rights and their own property rights in challenging and 
sometimes defeating any regulationsfederal or state
protective of the environment.345 
B. Workplaces 
In contrast to judicial preservation of tort claims for 
workplace injuries,346 state workplace regulations and pension 
provisions have been struck down despite strongly worded 
statutory savings clauses.347 With respect to workplace safety, 
OSHA includes an explicit savings clause for common law 
remedies and also specifies that states are free to assert[ ] 
jurisdiction under State law over any occupational safety or 
health issue with respect to which no [OSHA] standard is in 
effect.348 States are authorized to assume responsibility for the 
development and the enforcement of occupational safety and 
health standards, but state standards may only be approved if 
the Secretary certifies that they are at least as effective as 
                                                          
 343. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 702 n.5 (1978). For commentary on 
deference to states on the allocation of water resources, see Benson, supra note 338; David 
H. Getches, The Metamorphosis of Western Water Policy: Have Federal Laws and Local 
Decisions Eclipsed the States Role?, 20 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 78 (2001); and Amy K. 
Kelley, Staging a ComebackSection 8 of the Reclamation Act, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 97, 
11718 (1984). 
 344. California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 653 (1978). 
 345. For decisions impeding federal regulatory authority over developers or 
irrigators, see, for example, James City County, Va. v. EPA, 12 F.3d 1330, 1336 (4th Cir. 
1993) (asserting CWA Section 1251(g), which precludes federal regulation from 
abrogating or superseding states authority to allocate water, to challenge a federal 
decision to veto a dam permit); Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 
49 Fed. Cl. 313, 314 (2001) (asserting a takings clause claim against the U.S. Bureau of 
Reclamation for curtailing deliveries to protect species). For judicial constraints on state 
environmental regulations, see Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 
1030 (1992), in which the Court held that a restriction on coastal development was a Fifth 
Amendment taking that required just compensation.  
 346. See supra Part III.B (reviewing Court jurisprudence with regard to tort claims 
arising from workplace hazards). 
 347. See 29 U.S.C. § 667(a) (2006) (workplace safety); 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2) (2006) 
(state regulated insurance plans). State requirements for resolving workplace disputes 
have also been struck down as preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act. Preston v. 
Ferrer, 128 S. Ct. 978, 981 (2008) (holding that when parties have agreed to arbitrate all 
questions arising under a service contract, federal law supersedes state statutes lodging 
primary jurisdiction in any other judicial or administrative forum). 
 348. 29 U.S.C. § 667(a) (2006). 
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federal standards and that the state will dedicate sufficient 
resources to administration and enforcement.349 Although many 
states simply adopt the OSHA regulations as their own, several 
have adopted more stringent requirements than provided by the 
federal floor on subjects ranging from fire codes to criminal 
enforcement schemes.350 
In Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Assn, a trade 
association sued to prevent Illinois from enforcing state laws 
providing for the licensure of workers at hazardous waste sites.351 
Both the association and OSHA argued that OSHAs standards 
for the training of workers who handle hazardous wastes 
preempted Illinois law. Emphasizing a desire to avoid subjecting 
employers to duplicative regulation, the Rehnquist Court agreed 
that the Act preempted any nonapproved state regulation of an 
occupational issue for which a federal standard had been 
adopted.352 Its opinion contracted the scope of the statutory 
savings clause by presupposing a background pre-emption of all 
state occupational safety and health standards whenever a 
federal standard governing the same issue is in effect.353 The 
Court noted, however, that state laws of general applicability, 
such as traffic safety laws and fire codes, would not be preempted 
because they regulate workers as members of the general public 
and not strictly as workers; in short, generally applicable 
requirements would not be considered occupational standards.354 
In the wake of Gade, states are precluded from issuing 
regulations that directly concern worker safety if any related 
federal standard exists, even when the state regulations advance 
congressional objectives by setting more protective standards 
than required by the federal regulatory floor, and even when 
enforcement of the state requirement would not preclude or 
otherwise conflict with enforcement of the federal standard. In 
effect, the Gade Court allowed OSHAs standards to occupy the 
entire field of licensure and training even though Congress 
evidenced its intent, through the statutory savings clause, not to 
do so.355 
                                                          
 349. 29 U.S.C. § 667(a)(c) (2006). 
 350. Getting Away With Murder, supra note 109, at 539 n.27. 
 351. Gade v. Natl Solid Wastes Mgmt. Assn, 505 U.S. 88, 94 (1992). 
 352. Id. at 10809. 
 353. Id. at 100. 
 354. Id. at 107. Similar reasoning was employed in Riegel. See Riegel v. Medtronic, 
Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 100910 (2008). 
 355. See 29 U.S.C. § 667(a) (2006) (allowing states to enact regulation over 
occupational safety and health issues where no standard exists under OSHA). 
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The Rehnquist Court gave the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act (ERISA) similarly broad preemptive effect.356 Prior 
to ERISA, several states had adopted aggressive laws requiring 
special insurance benefits, such as cost of living increases, in 
pensions.357 To preempt disparate and increasingly onerous state 
laws regulating employee benefit plans, unions and employers 
alike sought federalization.358 State insurance commissions, 
however, wanted to preserve their traditional role over 
insurance.359 Congress crafted a compromise in ERISAs 
preemption and savings clauses.360 First, ERISA expressly 
preempts any and all State laws insofar as they may now or 
hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan [covered by 
ERISA].361 The all-important preemptive phrase relate to was 
left undefined, but an employee welfare benefit plan includes 
any plan, fund, or program which was heretofore or is 
hereafter established or maintained by an employer or by 
an employee organization, or by both, to the extent that 
such plan, fund, or program was established or is 
maintained for the purpose of providing for its participants 
or their beneficiaries, through the purchase of insurance or 
otherwise . . . medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits, 
or benefits in the event of sickness, accident, disability, 
death or unemployment, or vacation benefits . . . .362 
Meanwhile, ERISAs savings clause preserves any law of 
any State which regulates insurance, banking, or securities, 
with the caveat that an employee benefit plan shall not be 
deemed to be an insurance company or other insurer, bank, trust 
company, or investment company . . . for purposes of [state 
regulation of banking, insurance, or securities].363  
                                                          
 356. See, e.g., Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 208 (2004) (citing 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 1001(b), 1144 (2006)). 
 357. Hills, supra note 11, at 40. 
 358. JAMES A. WOOTEN, THE EMPLOYMENT RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 
1974: A POLITICAL HISTORY 25859, 26465 (2004). 
 359. Id. at 23435. 
 360. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a), (b)(2) (2006); see also 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (2006) (It is 
hereby declared to be the policy of this chapter to protect interstate commerce and the 
interests of participants in employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries, by requiring 
the disclosure and reporting to participants and beneficiaries of financial and other 
information with respect thereto, by establishing standards of conduct, responsibility, and 
obligation for fiduciaries of employee benefit plans, and by providing for appropriate 
remedies, sanctions, and ready access to the Federal courts.). 
 361. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 362. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (2006). 
 363. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A)(B) (2006). 
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An understanding of these two phrases can be gleaned from 
the purpose of ERISA to protect plan administrators (chiefly 
employers and unions) and employees . . . . [not] to protect 
doctors, hospitals, MCOs [managed care organizations], or other 
third parties who administered plan benefits on behalf of 
employers.364 At the time of enactment in 1974, attention was 
focused on vesting and funding requirements for pensions, not 
the regulation of MCOs, which barely existed at the time.365 
During the 1970s, most benefit plans simply reimbursed fees for 
medical services, wherever those services were rendered.366 
Managed care soon became the vehicle of choice, however, for 
controlling health care costs. It was not long before the courts 
had to determine whether ERISA preempted the regulation of 
third parties hired by plan administrators to provide plan 
benefits. Professor Roderick Hills described the dilemma: 
[E]mployers contracts with MCOs are not employee 
welfare benefit plans covered by ERISA, because this 
statutory term encompasses only contracts between 
employers, unions, or other plan administrators and 
employees. In addition . . . no credence has been given to 
the suggestion that any state lawsay, state taxes or state-
law malpractice liabilityrelates to employment relations 
under ERISA merely because such laws will affect the price 
of MCOs services. By the same token, one could argue that 
state regulation of the employers contracts with MCOs do 
not relate to employers benefit plans merely because such 
laws will affect the cost of those benefit plans.367 
The Supreme Court exhibited some tolerance for state 
regulation of MCOs and other insurers368 until its 2004 opinion in 
Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila.369 There, the Rehnquist Court 
preempted the Texas Health Care Liability Act, citing allegedly 
clear congressional intent to displace liability of MCOs that 
administered ERISA-covered benefit plans.370 As a result, state 
regulation of employee benefits has been almost wholly eclipsed 
                                                          
 364. Hills, supra note 11, at 41. 
 365. Id. 
 366. Id. 
 367. Id. at 4142. 
 368. Id. at 4344 (discussing De Buono v. NYSA-ILA Med. & Clinical Servs. Fund, 
520 U.S. 806 (1997); Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., 
N.A., Inc., 519 U.S. 316 (1997); N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans 
v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645 (1995)). 
 369. See Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 214 (2004) (holding that 
respondents claims fell within ERISA section 502(a)(1)(B) and were thus preempted by 
ERISA). 
 370. Id. at 209, 21314. 
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by ERISA. Meanwhile, Congress has failed to address the MCO 
issue,371 although immunity from liability for damages caused by 
wrongful denial of benefits would be unlikely to win a majority 
vote if the issue were to come directly before Congress.372 The 
result has been a regulatory vacuum where injured persons 
cannot obtain meaningful relief.373 
C. Agriculture 
The supervision of agricultural practices within a state, 
especially those related to food quality, has always been deemed 
a matter of peculiarly local concern.374 Accordingly, an early 
Rehnquist Court decision rejected a preemption challenge to local 
restrictions on pesticide spraying in Wisconsin Public Intervenor 
v. Mortier and construed the statutory savings clause of FIFRA 
in a manner that allowed local governments to protect their 
citizens health.375 The holding rested in part on the plain 
language of the savings clause itself, which authorizes states to 
impose more (but not less) stringent regulations on the sale or 
use of any federally registered pesticide376 and in part on 
recognition of the states historic powers to regulate agricultural 
activities within their borders.377 
                                                          
 371. See Hills, supra note 11, at 42 (By bestowing the protection of ERISA 
preemption on the managed care industry, the Court eliminated that industrys incentive 
to lobby Congress for any clarification of ERISAs scope. The result arguably has been 
gridlock in Congress over the status of managed care for decades.). 
 372. Id. at 53. 
 373. See Aetna, 542 U.S. at 222 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (observing that the Court 
has created a regulatory vacuum . . . in which persons adversely affected by ERISA-
proscribed wrongdoing cannot gain make-whole relief). In its 1983 opinion in Pacific Gas, 
the Burger Court explicitly noted, It is almost inconceivable that Congress would have 
left a regulatory vacuum; the only reasonable inference is that Congress intended the 
states to continue to make . . . judgments related to the need for nuclear power. Pac. Gas 
& Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Commn, 461 U.S. 190, 20708 
(1983); see also supra note 248 and accompanying text (summarizing the Pacific Gas 
opinion). 
 374. Mich. Canners & Freezers Assn v. Agric. Mktg. & Bargaining Bd., 467 U.S. 461, 
470 (1984) (quoting Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 144 (1963)); 
see also Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 608 (1991) (finding that Congress 
intended to leave the regulation of pesticides to the absolute discretion of the States); 
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 22930 (1947) (observing that states 
historically regulated grain warehouses). 
 375. Wisconsin Public Intervenor, 501 U.S. at 60708. 
 376. 7 U.S.C. § 136v(a) (2006) (A State may regulate the sale or use of any federally 
registered pesticide or device in the State, but only if and to the extent the regulation does 
not permit any sale or use prohibited by this subchapter.); see also supra notes 23132 
and accompanying text (discussing Wisconsin Public Intervenor and FIFRAs savings 
clauses). 
 377. Wisconsin Public Intervenor, 501 U.S. at 608. Where state agricultural laws 
authorize conduct that a federal statute specifically forbids, however, the state law will 
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The presumption against preemption of state powers played 
a role in saving state agricultural laws, even absent a savings 
clause, in an earlier case, Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. 
v. Paul.378 There, the Warren Court considered the effect of 
federal law on a California statute imposing maturity standards 
for avocados. Both laws had the purpose of protecting consumers 
from sub-par agricultural products.379 The federal requirements 
were adopted pursuant to the Agricultural Adjustment Act, 
enacted to restore and maintain parity prices for the benefit of 
producers of agricultural commodities, to ensure the stable and 
steady flow of commodities to consumers, and to establish and 
maintain . . . minimum standards of quality and maturity.380 A 
portion of Florida avocados could not meet the more stringent 
California standards. There was no question that Congress had 
the power, under the Commerce Clause, to regulate agricultural 
commodities,381 so the Florida Avocado Growers asserted implied 
preemption to displace the California standards. The Court, as 
an initial observation, found that the regulation of food quality 
was an area of traditional state concernthe States have 
always possessed a legitimate interest in the protection 
of . . . [their] people against fraud and deception in the sale of 
food products at retail markets within their borders.382 In 
upholding the California regulation, the Court invoked the 
presumption against preemption and sought, but did not find, 
clear congressional intent to oust state authority over 
agricultural products.383 
                                                          
still be displaced under conflict preemption. See Michigan Canners, 467 U.S. at 478 
(noting that by certifying associations as exclusive bargaining agents for all producers of a 
particular commodity, Michigan law conflicted with the federal Agricultural Fair 
Practices Act, which was intended to protect the rights of farmers to join cooperative 
associations by which to market their products); see also Jim Chen, Of Agricultures First 
Disobedience and Its Fruit, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1261, 1286 (1995) (describing the 
Agricultural Fair Practices Act as providing farm owners generous legal 
safeguards . . . against coercion by product handlers). 
 378. Fla. Lime, 373 U.S. at 132. 
 379. Id. at 137. 
 380. Id. at 138 (quoting 7 U.S.C. § 602(3) (2006)). 
 381. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 12829 (1942) (holding that Congress had 
the authority to regulate the price of wheat, even that wheat consumed entirely on the 
farm upon which it was grown). 
 382. Fla. Lime, 373 U.S. at 144 (quoting Plumley v. Massachusetts, 155 U.S. 461, 
472 (1894)). 
 383. Id. at 14647. Other than labeling restrictions, state and local provisions related 
to agricultural chemicals have generally survived preemption challenges in the lower 
courts. See Croplife Am., Inc. v. City of Madison, 373 F. Supp. 2d 905, 908 (W.D. Wis. 
2005) (upholding city and county ordinances barring the sale of fertilizers containing 
phosphorus); Chem. Producers and Distribs. Ass'n v. Helliker, 319 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1118 
(C.D. Cal. 2004) (upholding a state law that granted exclusive rights to data to the 
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D. Medical Devices, Drugs, and Practices 
As with agricultural practices, many states have 
traditionally taken an active role in the struggle to protect their 
residents from public health risks posed by waterborne diseases, 
smoke inhalation, and unsafe workplaces.384 This is no less true of 
the public health risks posed by drugs and other harmful 
products.385 States have attempted to guard against epidemics 
and injuries through regulatory means as well as jury awards.386 
Yet when faced with preemption challenges, states have been 
less successful in maintaining regulatory efforts over drugs that 
affect their citizens health. 
A 2008 opinion by the Roberts Court is, at the time of this 
writing, the latest chapter in the saga of federal preemption of 
states efforts to regulate the sale and consumption of tobacco 
products. In this case, Rowe v. New Hampshire Motor Transport 
Assn, the Court struck down a regulatory effort by the State of 
Maine to protect the health of its youngest citizens from the 
health risks posed by cigarettes.387 
In recent years, tobacco sales to adolescents over the 
Internet have reached epidemic proportions, posing a grave 
danger to public health.388 In 2003, to thwart underage 
consumption, the Maine legislature adopted a statute requiring 
shippers of tobacco products to utilize delivery services that 
would verify the legal age of the buyer.389 A provision of the 
Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act preempts 
states from enacting or enforcing a law . . . related to a price, 
route, or service of any motor carrier . . . with respect to the 
transportation of property.390 The goal of the Act is to deregulate 
the transportation industry and induce maximum reliance on 
competitive market forces.391 In a unanimous opinion, the Court 
                                                          
original applicants, thereby making registration more costly for companies subsequently 
seeking to register generic pesticides), vacated as moot, 463 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 384. See supra Part III.AC. (discussing tort preemption issues in the areas of 
environment and energy, workplace hazards, and products liability). 
 385. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996); Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 
S. Ct. 999, 1013 (2008) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 386. See supra Part III.C.1. (analyzing preemption battles over tort claims arising 
from drugs and medical devices). 
 387. Rowe v. N.H. Motor Transp. Assn, 128 S. Ct. 989, 993 (2008). 
 388. Id. at 999 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (quoting Brief for California et al. as Amici 
Curiae for Petitioner at 9, Rowe, 128 S. Ct. 989 (No. 06-457)). 
 389. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1555-C(3)(C) (2004). 
 390. 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1) (2000); see also 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(4)(A) (2000) 
(prohibiting states from enacting similar laws concerning air carriers). 
 391. Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 378 (1992) (quoting 49 
U.S.C. § 1302(a)(4) (current version at 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (2000))). 
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held that Maines statute was preempted.392 It reasoned that to 
interpret the federal law to permit these . . . state requirements 
could easily lead to a patchwork of state service-determining 
laws, rules, and regulations contrary to Congresss decision to 
leave such decisions to the marketplace.393 It rejected Maines 
attempt to avail itself of various exceptions within the Act that 
allow states to set local route controls, insurance requirements, 
and the like, finding no evidence that Congress intended to save 
other types of state laws.394 
In view of the Acts broad preemption language and its lack 
of an explicit savings clause, the result in the Maine case is not 
terribly surprising. It does, however, evidence a large regulatory 
gap left by Congress, which probably did not foresee the growth 
of online tobacco sales and deliveries fostered by the Internet.395 
Justice Ginsburg and a number of states have urged Congress to 
fill that gap.396 
An anomaly in the Supreme Courts recent pro-preemption 
jurisprudence can be seen in a case involving a patients ability to 
seek a doctors assistance in effectuating a deeply personal 
medical choicenamely, life or death.397 The Court has 
demonstrated more willingness to respect state regulatory 
choices in this area, in part because of the historic backdrop of 
state authority regarding medical practice and in part because 
Congress has been exceptionally careful to include a strongly 
worded savings clause for medical prescriptions.398 
A doctors ability to use lethal doses of prescription drugs to 
assist terminally ill patients with suicide has long been the 
subject of heated debate.399 Congress has provided no federal 
resolution, and states have taken vastly different approaches to 
                                                          
 392. Rowe, 128 S. Ct. at 992, 995. 
 393. Id. at 996. 
 394. Id. at 997. 
 395. Id. at 99899 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). A similar preemption provision was 
adopted in 1978 in the Airline Deregulation Act and expanded to motor carriers in the 
1994 Federal Aviation Administration Act. Id. at 993 (majority opinion) (citing 49 U.S.C. 
§ 1302(a)(4) (current version at 49 U.S.C. §§ 40101, 14501(c)(1) (2000))). 
 396. Id. at 99899 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
 397. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 24849 (2006). 
 398. 21 U.S.C. § 903 (2006) (No provision of this subchapter shall be construed as 
indicating an intent on the part of the Congress to occupy the field . . . to the exclusion of 
any State law on the same subject matter . . . .). 
 399. Melvin I. Urofsky, Leaving the Door Ajar: The Supreme Court and Assisted 
Suicide, 32 U. RICH. L. REV. 313, 33132 (1998); see also Brett Kingsbury, A Line Already 
Drawn: The Case for Voluntary Euthanasia After the Withdrawal of Life-Sustaining 
Hydration and Nutrition, 38 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 201, 219 (2004) (proposing that a 
constitutional right to privacy could form the basis for an argument in support of an 
individuals right to suicide). 
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fill the void.400 Dr. Jack Kevorkian was prosecuted and jailed 
under Michigan law for injecting lethal drugs at the behest of a 
patient dying of Lou Gehrigs disease.401 In contrast, an Oregon 
law specifically allows physician-assisted suicide through a 
statute that authorizes licensed physicians to administer lethal 
drugs, but only after counseling about palliative alternatives and 
ensuring that patients are competent to make life ending 
decisions.402 
The Oregon law provoked a preemption challenge by the 
U.S. Attorney General under the Controlled Substances Act.403 
Despite its comprehensive nature, the Acts savings clause 
cautions against displacement of state law by stating that, 
absent a direct conflict, none of the Acts provisions should be 
construed as indicating an intent to occupy the field . . . to the 
exclusion of any State law on the same subject matter which 
would otherwise be within the authority of the State, unless 
there is a positive conflict between that provision of this 
subchapter and that State law so that the two cannot 
consistently stand together.404 
The Roberts Court rejected the preemption challenge in 
Gonzales v. Oregon.405 It noted that, although Congress could, as 
a matter of constitutional power, establish national standards for 
the administration of prescription drugs, Congress had not in 
fact done so.406 While the Controlled Substances Act represents a 
comprehensive regime to combat the international and interstate 
traffic in illicit drugs,407 the congressional objective regarding the 
type of medical service at issue in Oregon was relatively 
modestbarring doctors from using prescription-writing powers 
to engage in illicit drug trafficking. This narrow objective, 
coupled with the savings clause, convinced the Court that 
Congress intended states to continue exercising their historic 
police powers by regulating the practice of medicine.408 Its 
interpretation of the CSA was based in no small part on the 
structure and limitations of federalism, which allow the States 
                                                          
 400. See Kingsbury, supra note 399, at 21112. 
 401. Vera Bergelson, The 2008 David J. Stoffer Lecture: Autonomy, Dignity, and 
Consent to Harm, 60 RUTGERS L. REV. 723, 732 (2008). 
 402. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.800127.897 (2007). 
 403. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 249 (2006); see also 21 U.S.C. § 903 (2006) 
(CSA savings clause). 
 404. 21 U.S.C. § 903 (2006). 
 405. Oregon, 546 U.S. at 27475. 
 406. Id. at 267, 26970. 
 407. Id. at 269 (quoting Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 12 (2005)). 
 408. Id. at 270. 
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great latitude under their police powers to legislate as to the 
protection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of all 
persons.409 According to the Court, background principles of our 
federal system . . . belie the notion that Congress would 
use . . . an obscure grant of authority to regulate areas 
traditionally supervised by the States police power.410 
Although the Roberts Court invoked federalism and the 
statutory savings clause to uphold the states historic powers 
over the practice of medicine in Oregon, it refused to do so in a 
California case involving prescribed uses of marijuana, issued 
just one year earlier.411 The Controlled Substances Act prohibits 
the possession, use, or distribution of marijuana as an illegal, 
controlled substance.412 In 1998, Congress passed a joint 
resolution addressing medical marijuana: Congress . . . opposes 
efforts to . . . legaliz[e] marijuana . . . for medicinal use without 
valid scientific evidence and the approval of the Food and Drug 
Administration.413 The American Medical Association recognizes 
marijuanas capacity to reduce nausea and pain and stimulate 
appetite, but has not endorsed its legalization, stating that the 
evidence of its benefits is too inconclusive to outweigh potential 
negative effects.414 As of 2005, however, California and eight 
other states had enacted laws allowing the use of marijuana for 
pain relief.415 
In Gonzales v. Raich, California growers and users sought 
injunctive and declaratory relief from the Controlled Substances 
Act.416 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that 
                                                          
 409. Id. at 30001 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
 410. Id. at 301 (citations omitted). 
 411. Raich, 545 U.S. at 9. 
 412. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 844(a) (2006). 
 413. Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, Pub. 
L. No. 105277, Div. F(11), 112 Stat. 2681, 2681761 (1998). 
 414. See 141 CONG. REC. E1374 (1995) (arguing against potential benefits of medical 
marijuana use) (statement of Rep. Solomon, referencing the Journal of the American 
Medical Association); Brief for Lymphoma Foundation of America et al. as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Respondents at 10, Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (No. 03-1454) (reporting that cannabis 
extract works to significantly relieve intractable pain in 18 out of 23 patients). The AMA 
has, however, taken the position that doctors should be able to freely discuss treatment 
alternatives with their patients, including marijuana, without fear of criminal sanctions. 
1 UELMEN AND HADDOX, DRUG ABUSE AND THE LAW SOURCEBOOK § 2:23 (2006) (citing 
American Medical Association House of Delegates, Dec. 1997); see also Conant v. 
McCaffrey, 172 F.R.D. 681, 685 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (granting preliminary injunction against 
imposition of federal criminal penalties on physicianpatient discussions about medical 
marijuana as a violation of physicians and patients free speech rights), permanent 
injunction entered, No. C-97-00139, 2000 WL 1281174 (N.D.Cal. Sept.7, 2000). 
 415. K.K. DuVivier, State Ballot Initiatives in the Federal Preemption Equation: A 
Medical Marijuana Case Study, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 221, 28386 (2005). 
 416. Raich, 545 U.S. at 67. 
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the Act was not controlling because the intrastate, 
noncommercial cultivation, possession and use of marijuana for 
personal medical purposes on the advice of a physicianis, in 
fact, different in kind from drug trafficking.417 It rejected the 
United States Commerce Clause justification, stating that the 
limited personal use of marijuana to alleviate pain is not 
properly characterized as commercial or economic activity, and 
upheld the California law.418 
The primary issue before the Supreme Court in Raich was 
whether the Commerce Clause authorized Congress to prohibit 
the use of homegrown marijuana,419 but the Court also invoked 
the Supremacy Clause to preempt the state law.420 It stated that 
the federal power over commerce is superior to that of the 
States to provide for the welfare or necessities of their 
inhabitants, however legitimate or dire those necessities may 
be.421 Notwithstanding the States traditional police powers to 
define the criminal law and to protect the health, safety, and 
welfare of their citizens, the Raich majority concluded that the 
federal Controlled Substances Act applied to, and therefore 
criminalized, the possession of medicinal marijuana because 
Congress could have rationally concluded that a broad 
application of the Act was necessary for the effective regulation 
of the larger interstate marijuana market.422 
Justices OConnor, Roberts, and Thomas invoked federalism 
concerns in dissent: 
This case exemplifies the role of States as 
laboratories. . . . Exercising [its core police] powers, 
California . . . has come to its own conclusion about the 
difficult and sensitive question of whether marijuana 
should be available to relieve severe pain and suffering. 
Today the Court sanctions an application of the federal 
Controlled Substances Act that extinguishes that 
experiment, without any proof that the personal cultivation, 
possession, and use of marijuana for medicinal purposes, if 
economic activity in the first place, has a substantial effect 
                                                          
 417. Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222, 1228 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 418. Id. at 122930. The Ninth Circuit distinguished previous decisions upholding 
the CSA on Commerce Clause grounds because they were based on the commercial 
nature of drug trafficking, while the marijuana at issue in Raich was not sold, nor did 
the aggregation principle of Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), apply as medicinal 
marijuana use is not commercial. Id. at 1230. 
 419. Raich, 545 U.S. at 15. 
 420. Id. at 29. 
 421. Id. (citations omitted). 
 422. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 300 (2006) (citations omitted). 
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on interstate commerce and is therefore an appropriate 
subject of federal regulation.423 
One year later, Justice Thomass dissent in the Oregon case 
echoed this theme, but used it to attack the majoritys decision to 
uphold Oregons euthanasia law: 
Confronted with a regulation that broadly requires all 
prescriptions to be issued for a legitimate medical 
purpose, a regulation recognized in Raich as part of the 
Federal Governments closed . . . system for 
regulating . . . controlled substances . . .  the majority 
rejects the Attorney Generals . . . determination that 
administering controlled substances to facilitate a patients 
death is not a  legitimate medical purpose. . . .   [I]n stark 
contrast to Raichs broad conclusions about the scope of the 
CSA . . . today this Court concludes that the CSA is merely 
concerned with fighting  drug abuse . . . .   
. . . .  
. . . [Yet] we are interpreting broad, straightforward 
language within a statutory framework that a majority of 
this Court has concluded is so comprehensive that it 
necessarily nullifies the States  traditional. . .powers. . .to 
protect the health, safety, and welfare of their citizens. 424 
The Oregon Courts reliance upon the same savings clause 
and the same constitutional principles that it rejected just one 
year earlier in Raich is perplexing, but there seem to be two key 
distinctions. First is the stance of the federal agency. In Raich, 
the FDA maintained its position that marijuana has no proven 
medical value, but rather a high potential for abuse.425 This 
militated against Californias interest in allowing the broadest 
array of medical choices, including medical marijuana, for its 
citizens. Conversely, in Oregon, the FDA took no position on 
medically assisted suicide, and the Drug Enforcement 
Administration had taken contradictory positions leading up to 
the litigation.426 The agencies ambivalence operated in Oregons 
                                                          
 423. Raich, 545 U.S. at 4243 (citing Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 635 
(1993); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 603 & n.30 (1977)). 
 424. Oregon, 546 U.S. at 299300, 302 (citations omitted). 
 425. Brief for Drug Free America Foundation, Inc., et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioner at 6, Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (No. 03-1454); Stephanie Armour, Employers Grapple 
with Medical Marijuana Use, USA TODAY, Apr. 17, 2007, at 1B; see also 21 C.F.R. 
§ 1308.11 (2008) (classifying marijuana as a Schedule I drug, which, under 21 U.S.C. 
§ 812(b)(1), has (1) a high potential for abuse; (2) no currently accepted treatment in the 
United States; and (3) a lack of accepted safety for use of the drug under medical 
supervision). 
 426. See Oregon, 546 U.S. at 25254 (describing vacillating agency positions through 
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favor. The second significant distinction between the two cases is 
that in Oregon, the state itself was a litigant, whereas in Raich, 
California weighed in only as an amicus, but did not have full 
party status. According to one theory of preemption, when states 
insist upon their right[s] as parties to the litigation, the 
Supreme Court is more likely to give them their due.427 
E. Harmonizing State Regulations with Federal Law 
Since the mid-1990s, the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts have 
consistently shielded industry from progressive state regulations 
in areas of traditional state concern ranging from pollution 
prevention to workplace safety. With the exception of certain 
agricultural practices, where states have imposed constraints on 
economic interests, statutory savings clauses have been given 
short shrift or even ignored. Conversely, in cases where state 
laws are less onerous on economic pursuits than federal 
regulation would be, prodevelopment interests have been upheld 
under the guise of saving state law. Despite the presence of 
savings clauses, progressive state regulatory programs have been 
even more vulnerable to judicial preemption than have state 
common law claims, particularly where the state, for whatever 
reason, was not a party to the litigation. 
If courts gave more careful attention to congressional choices 
reflected in statutory savings clauses and, more generally, the 
remedial purposes of federal public health and environmental 
statutes, there would be fewer regulatory gaps. In some cases, 
savings clauses reflect congressional determinations of 
institutional competency, fairness, and efficiency, while in others, 
savings clauses signal congressional intent to allow regulatory 
overlap to ensure comprehensive coverage. In either case, absent 
an unequivocal expression of congressional intent to preempt, 
federal law should not be construed to preempt state programs 
that provide greater protection than is established by the federal 
regulatory baseline, particularly where states are uniquely 
competent to provide enhanced protection to their citizens, as in 
the four areas analyzed above (protection from pollution, unsafe 
products, hazardous workplaces, and unsafe or otherwise 
inappropriate agricultural practices). 
                                                          
the Clinton and Bush Administrations). On the relevance of agencies positions in 
preemption cases, see sources cited supra note 185. 
 427. Greve & Klick, supra note 3, at 68. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Statutory savings clauses have been included in many 
federal regulatory statutes in order to temper Congresss 
extraordinary power to displace state laws.428 Savings clauses 
preserve the states ability to use a variety of regulatory and 
common law tools to provide increased protection for their 
citizens and the environment over and above the federal 
regulatory floor. Supreme Court precedent in both the Rehnquist 
and Roberts Courts, however, has interpreted savings clauses in 
a fashion that diminishes overall protection of health, safety, and 
environmental quality. 
Ignoring explicit savings clauses or construing them unduly 
narrowly undermines congressional policy in the highly sensitive, 
politically charged area of federalstate relations. Conversely, 
giving savings clauses appropriate weight honors congressional 
choices, avoids regulatory gaps, fosters innovative measures to 
protect human health and the environment, and enhances 
institutional competency by empowering governments at all 
levels to protect the public at appropriate scales. 
The preemption decisions of both the Roberts and Rehnquist 
Courts have flouted the cooperative federalism objectives 
articulated by Congress in its environmental and public welfare 
enactments of the past three decades. Judicial narrowing of 
savings clauses is especially troubling when common law 
remedies are displaced. There are compelling reasons for courts 
to apply the presumption against preemption faithfully to 
preserve states powers to protect human health and welfare 
through the common law. Leaving individuals without adequate 
means of redressing invasions of their privacy, health, and 
property causes a severe imbalance between government and 
corporate power and individual rights. In most cases, federal 
regulatory requirements and state common law can be easily 
harmonized. Far from undermining congressional objectives, 
state common law remedies give greater force to federal remedial 
purposes. Moreover, through discovery and trial, common law 
litigation can bring relevant information to light about the 
harmful effects of the product or activity in question, in some 
cases long before the agency gets wind of it. Both outcomes foster 
greater respect for, and stability of, the law as a whole. 
Giving savings clauses proper weight is important in the 
regulatory arena, too. Although an argument can be made that 
preemption is more justified in regulatory cases than in tort 
                                                          
 428. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991). 
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cases if the state or local regulation at issue poses a greater 
threat to the union-preserving objective of the preemption 
doctrine than do tort claims,429 the review of cases undertaken in 
this Article reveals no such threat. Thus, so long as the state 
regulation in question does not obstruct the accomplishment of 
Congresss objectives, state regulatory choices should be honored. 
This is especially true when those choices are made against a 
backdrop of the states traditional police powers for the protection 
of public health and safety, and the regulation of utility services, 
insurance providers, and local agricultural practices.430 
Where Congress has included a savings clause, 
straightforward rules of statutory construction dictate that state 
laws and remedies related to the subject matter of the clause 
should not be displaced. If the clause does not strictly apply to 
the state law or activity in question, implied preemption 
arguments may still be raised to defeat the state law, but the 
savings clause should be seen as evidencing congressional intent 
not to occupy the field.431 Moreover, the savings clause should 
weigh against a blanket determination that state law poses an 
obstacle to the accomplishment of federal purposes.432 
Notwithstanding the presence of a savings clause, challengers 
will still be successful in defeating state provisions if they can 
show an actual conflict between state and federal law, as the 
Supremacy Clause mandates that federal law trumps conflicting 
state law when federal and state laws collide such that the 
compliance with one necessitates the violation of the other.433 
For its part, Congress should employ more precision in 
drafting. Many have called upon Congress to speak more clearly 
regarding preemption.434 In the event that Congress intends to 
                                                          
 429. Joondeph, supra note 41, at 507, 509 (citing 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-1 (3d ed. 2000)). 
 430. See supra notes 2022 and accompanying text. 
 431. See, e.g., Cleveland v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 985 F.2d 1438, 1442 (10th Cir. 1993) 
(interpreting savings clause as evidence of Congresss reluctance to displace state common 
law), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 908 (1993). 
 432. See A. Benjamin Spencer, Anti-Federalist Procedure, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
233, 284 (2007) (arguing that savings clauses should serve as an absolute bar to field and 
obstacle preemption); id. (Federalism-respecting procedure would . . . treat savings 
clauses as foreclosing any recourse to implied preemption.). 
 433. See id. at 285 (arguing that conflict preemption is in no sense implied . . . quite 
to the contrary, such preemption is the most basic and express form of preemption that 
exists because the express terms of the Supremacy Clause . . . call for it); see also Erwin 
Chemerinsky, Empowering States: The Need to Limit Federal Preemption, 33 PEPP. L. 
REV. 69, 7475 (2005) ([T]here should be only two situations when there is preemption of 
state law. One is express preemption. The other is when federal law and state law are 
mutually exclusive, so it is not possible for somebody to comply with both.). 
 434. See, e.g., Grey, supra note 132, at 627 ([R]equiring that Congress speak clearly 
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save the broadest array of state and local laws, it might craft a 
savings clause that reads as follows: 
Nothing in this act shall be construed to occupy the field on 
the topics subject to this act. Moreover, absent a direct 
conflict that makes compliance with both state and federal 
law impossible, nothing in this act shall be construed to 
affect state or local provisions, be they legislative, 
regulatory, or judicial in nature, and nothing in this act 
shall in any way affect, or be construed to affect, statutory 
or common law requirements, rights, or remedies.435 
To the extent that Congress chooses to use terms such as 
requirements, rights, or remedies, it should define each 
term to foreclose judicial resort to generic dictionary 
definitions.436 Finally, to ensure the broadest possible application, 
the savings clause should be placed within the statutory chapter 
on General Provisions, rather than tucked within a subchapter 
related to a discrete topic.437 
That said, there is no magic formula, and indeed there is 
good reason to be skeptical that language alone will tip the 
judicial scales.438 The Supreme Court itself acknowledged that not 
even the most dedicated hair-splitter can distinguish the highly 
analogous text of most preemption and savings clauses.439 Despite 
careful drafting, preemption cases may continue to exhibit faux 
textualism, where the Court invokes the so-called plain 
meaning of a statutory clause to reach antiregulatory results.440 
Yet the decision about relative institutional competencies 
and the need for innovation at various levels of government is 
constitutionally vested in Congress through the Supremacy 
Clause, and there is nothing wrong with demanding greater 
                                                          
will help ensure that its decision to preempt is the product of a deliberate policy choice.). 
 435. See supra notes 10105, 25062 and accompanying text (discussing judicial 
treatment of the Atomic Energy Act); supra notes 8990 and accompanying text 
(discussing judicial treatment of the Clean Water Act). 
 436. See supra notes 28284 and accompanying text (describing judicial invocation of 
Websters Dictionary to find preemption of standards). 
 437. See United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 10506 (2000) (giving a restrictive 
reading to the OPAs savings clause by finding that its placement in Title I limited its 
scope to oil pollution liability and compensation, while vessel manning requirements are 
contained in Title II, which includes no savings clause). 
 438. See Davis, supra note 16, at 972 (joining the chorus of those who call for 
Congress to speak clearly regarding its intent to preempt state law, but expressing doubt 
that courts will hear the song); Spence & Murray, supra note 39, at 1149 (observing that 
statutes containing savings clauses have failed to produce any more consistent 
preemption results than statutes containing express preemption provisions). 
 439. Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 446 n.21 (2005) (citation 
omitted). 
 440. Hills, supra note 11, at 9. 
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precision from our elected officials. In the absence of precision, 
courts are left with an unenviable job. Arguably, one of the 
advantages of judicial invocation of the presumption against 
preemption is the impetus for stakeholders to step forward and 
pressure Congress to place the issue on its decisionmaking 
agenda.441 A disadvantage, however, lies in the political process 
as well. Although state and local governments and 
representatives of injured persons may lobby Congress for 
explicit savings clauses if courts find in favor of preemption, 
collective action theories suggestand the weight of the evidence 
showsthese groups are less successful in seeking and obtaining 
legislation than regulated entities motivated by judicial decisions 
against preemption.442 
If, on the other hand, Congress chooses to include both 
savings and preemption clauses, either because it wishes to carve 
out an area for preemptive effect or because both clauses are 
necessary to achieve passage of the statute in question, it must 
be especially clear regarding the specific topic to be preempted. It 
must also be clear regarding whether preemption extends only to 
positive enactments and regulations or to other types of 
requirements, such as common law remedies. Of course, this may 
be impossible if the two clauses were included not to carve out 
specific spheres of federal and state activity but instead to reach 
an ambiguous yet passage-enabling compromise. If this is the 
case, the judicial presumption against preemption should still be 
given full force when states adopt measures protective of their 
citizens health, safety, and well-being in areas within their 
historic police powers, but in the end judges, rather than 
Congress, will be left to resolve the preemption issue with little 
meaningful guidance from the Supreme Court. 
 
                                                          
 441. See id. at 22 (arguing that, if regulated entities are upset by the prospect of non-
uniform state requirements, they will be motivated to contact their lobbyists and seek a 
clear preemptive provision from Congress); see also DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 93, 
at 150708 (concluding that state regulation often acts as a catalyst that prompts 
industry to seek preemption from Congress). 
 442. See Hills, supra note 11, at 11 (noting that collective action problems prevent 
people from coalescing on behalf of a common but diffuse interest . . . . [T]hese difficulties 
are exacerbated by the fact of heterogeneous preferences in a large republic.); id. at 54 
(explaining that the protection of MCOs from liability under ERISA was the result of a 
clash of powerful interestspatients, trial lawyers, insurers, the managed care industry, 
doctors, and the general public); cf. Note, New Evidence on the Presumption Against 
Preemption: An Empirical Study of Congressional Responses to Supreme Court 
Preemption Decisions, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1604, 1605, 1619 (2007) (concluding that 
Congress rarely responds to the Courts preemption decisions by amending the statute at 
issue). 
